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LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND "DISCLOSURE
ADVERTISING": TOWARDS A NEW ETHOS
SANDRA L. DEGRAw* & BRUCE W. BURTON**
In this Article, Professors Sandra L. DeGraw and Bruce W.
Burton explore the subject of lawyer disciplinary measures and
public confidence in the legal system. They argue that discipli-
nary action against lawyers is rarely published in any pub-
licly-available, systematic form. At the same time, they assert
that an increasing perception of lawyer misconduct has caused a
loss of confidence in the legal system. Accordingly, they maintain
that regular publication of lawyer misconduct can help assuage
this loss of confidence in the legal profession.
Professors DeGraw and Burton begin by analyzing the cur-
rent state of lawyer advertising. Because the practice of law is
evolving from a profession to a business, and because lawyer ad-
vertising has become ubiquitous in our society, they feel that non-
disclosure of lawyer discipline creates a marketplace of imperfect
information. They argue that full disclosure of lawyer miscon-
duct will counterbalance lawyer self-promotion and cure this
asymmetry in information. They analyze the constitutional impli-
cations of required disclosure of lawyer discipline and conclude
that under Bates v. State Bar of Arizona and its progeny, the
Court is likely to approve measures that merely require addi-
tional disclosure in lawyer advertising instead of restricting com-
mercial speech itself
After justifying the need for mandatory disclosure of lawyer
misconduct, Professors DeGraw and Burton provide a detailed
proposal for a system of disclosure advertising. They identify and
discuss features salient to their system of mandatory disclosure:
the description of misconduct that should be disclosed; the types
of lawyer communications that should be affected; and the length
of time for which disclosure should be required. They conclude
by reasserting their contention that mandatory disclosure of law-
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yer misconduct is a necessary step in restoring public confidence
in the legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By 1990, people came to share a disquieting sense offragmenting
community, of eroding public purpose, of institutions that no
longer function ....
William Strauss & Neil Howe'
1. GENERaATIONS: Tii HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FutruRE 1584 TO 2069 at 348 (1991).
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Grand theft of client funds,2 court-damaging "wildcat" litigation tactics,'
sexual harassment of clients,4 obstruction of justice,5 inventive conflicts of
interest 6-serious improprieties continuously surface as lawyers are sanc-
2. An Indiana attorney, previously disbarred in Kentucky, stole $145,000 from a terminally
ill, 90-year-old widow-client confined to a nursing home and was sanctioned with 10,000 hours of
mandatory community service plus a temporary suspension. NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 6.
3. As stated by United States District Judge Wayne E. Alley: "If there is a hell to which
disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it be one in which the damned are eternally
locked in discovery disputes with other lawyers of equally repugnant attributes." Krueger v. Peli-
can Prod. Corp., No. CIV-87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 1989). Often the cost of the abusive
trial tactics far exceeds the amount in dispute. The frustration of one court system is clear from
U.S. Circuit Judge Clarence Arlen Beam's comments:
[P]laintiff's counsel conducted the litigation in a manner that escalated costs unnecessa-
rily and vexatiously .... was frivolous and abusive and not directed toward 'the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of [the] action'.... [T]he costs of this pro-
longed litigation have far exceeded the amount of investment capital which is its subject
matter.
Lupo v. R. Rowland & Co., 857 F.2d 482, 485-86 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Bastien v. Rowland &
Co., 116 F.R.D. 619, 621 (E.D. Mo. 1987)); see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
4. In Wisconsin, a male attorney was found to have made unsolicited sexual advances to-
ward female clients in 1973 and was suspended until he could recover from a personality disorder;
subsequently, during the next two decades, the attorney was disciplined on several occasions,
including a 60-day suspension for sexual harassment of female clients. The attorney was ulti-
mately disbarred in 1992. In re Heilprin, 482 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Wis. 1992).
It should be noted that in other Wisconsin cases, license revocations and suspensions have
resulted from similar conduct E.g., In re Hallows, 401 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Wis. 1987); In re
Gibson, 369 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Wis. 1985). Lenient sanctions have been the custom when attor-
ney sexual misconduct is involved. Anthony E. Davis & Judith Grimaldi, Sexual Confusion:
Attorney-Client Sex and the Need for a Clear Ethical Rule, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs & PuB.
POL'y 57, 79 (1993). In South Dakota, an attorney was suspended for a year for leading female
clients to believe that sexual favors would reduce his fees for services. In re Bergren, 455 N.W.2d
856, 857 (S.D. 1990). A two-year suspension was invoked in New York in response to a repeated
pattern of sexual solicitation of both female clients and the wives of male clients. In re Bowen,
542 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1989). In Maine and New Hampshire, however, sexual misconduct has led
to disbarment. See, e.g., Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Murphy, 570 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Me.
1990); Otis' Case, 609 A.2d 1199, 1204 (N.H. 1992).
5. A West Virginia attorney had his license to practice law revoked after the use of intimi-
dation, physical force, threats, and misleading conduct, all with the intent to influence the testi-
mony of witnesses in an official proceeding in direct violation of a statute. Committee on Legal
Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Folio, 401 S.E.2d 248, 253 (W. Va. 1990). In Iowa, an attorney who
failed to cooperate with an investigation by bar authorities inquiring into his own misconduct was
suspended without possibility of reinstatement for three years. In re Kirshen, 451 N.W.2d 807,
809 (Iowa 1990).
6. An Iowa attorney persuaded one of his clients to co-sign a note in the amount of
$195,000 on behalf of another client, never advising the first client that the attorney and the
debtor-client were joint venturers in a business partnership and that the loan was directed toward
those ends. The attorney also failed to advise the co-signing client that he should seek independ-
ent legal counsel or that the attorney's personal interests in the transaction might affect his profes-
sional judgment on the lender-client's behalf. Later, this same attorney persuaded the
lender-client to co-sign notes and pay off debts on behalf of the attorney on the theory that other
business dealings between the attorney and that client would be put into bankruptcy to the client's
detriment. The attorney advised the client to seek separate legal representation after all of the
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tioned and disciplined for misconduct that ranges across the entire spectrum
of abuse. Like a river of negative news with its tributaries flowing from
every jurisdiction, disciplinary violations are reported in bar journals and
court advance sheets every month and even, on occasion, in daily newspa-
pers of general circulation.7  Such unlawyerly conduct is generally per-
ceived, at least in part, as one of the major causes of the bar-acknowledged
"crisis of confidence" that the public has in the legal profession.8
payment and loan formalities had been completed. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct
of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Hall, 463 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa 1990).
7. More than 30 serious disciplinary cases reported each month are not unusual in large
states. For example, during the six-month period of February 1991 through July 1991, California
Lawyer reported a total of 194 disbarments, suspensions, resignations while charges were pending,
and other disciplinary dispositions of named attorneys involving such violations as those noted in
text. This averaged about 32 reports per month. The trend in California, which has a detailed
reporting system in California Lawyer, does not seem to show much abatement. Over the past
four years, the November disciplinary reports have ranged from 20 in 1989; 60 in 1990; 52 in
1991; and 39 in 1992. CAL. LAw., Nov. 1992, at 75-88; Nov. 1991, at 81-93; Nov. 1990, at
96-107; Nov. 1989 at 131-33.
Similarly, the Texas Bar Journal recently reported 48 disciplinary cases in one month, 19
named attorneys and 29 anonymous ones, with misdeeds ranging from forgery to trust account
violations to neglect of client matters. 56 TEx. B.J. 295, 298 (1993). The trend in Texas during
recent months shows 47 reports in both January and February 1993; 20 in December 1992; 35 in
November 1992; and 39 in October 1992. These figures reveal an average of about 39 reports per
month during the six-month period. Id. Mar. 1993 at 295-98; Feb. 1993 at 131-32; Jan. 1993 at
73-74; Dec. 1992 at 1187-88; Nov. 1992 at 1087-89; Oct. 1992 at 978-82.
The general media recently reported the second disbarment of a Delaware/Texas lawyer and
talk show host, whose misdeeds set the record in Delaware for client complaints. Ruth Piller,
Lawyer Who Was Host of Television Show Is Disbarred, HousToN CHRON., MAR. 27, 1993, at
A26.
8. Lawyer Discipline Hearings, 76 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 109. General media reports
about the soaring number of client complaints or sensational stories of misconduct may fuel this
perception. E.g., William Grady, As State's Lawyers Rise, Complaints Soar, CHI. TRIu., May 9,
1989, at C4; Piller, supra note 7, at A26. Anti-lawyer sentiments surface in formal fashion, such
as the public interest group Help Abolish Legal Tyranny (HALT) and its national movement, or
the magazine Anti-Shyster published in Dallas. Two of the operative premises underlying the
ABA's current concerns with lawyer discipline and other matters are the need to protect the con-
suming public and the current lack of public confidence. ABA, LAwYER REGULATION FOR A NEw
CENTuRy: REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT XV, xvii
(1992) [hereinafter McKAY REPORT]. In November 1992, the ABA announced that it would
make "improving the image of the profession a key goal nationwide during the next few years."
Altman et al., How Can Lawyers Improve Their Image?, Report to Legal Management 1-12
(1993), also reports a series of negative opinions the public holds toward the legal profession for
lacking promptness, clarity of communications, ethics, and reliability; see Robert Guzy, Image of
the Lawyer "Revisited," 50 BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 1993, at 5.
Current surveys show that lawyers rank at the bottom of the 12 rated professions in terms of
trustworthiness, along with insurance agents. Mary Lahr Schier, Lawyers' Image: What's to be
Done?, 50 BENCH & B. MINN., Mar. 1993, at 16.
According to former Chief Justice Warren Burger.
In my view the standing of lawyers is at the very lowest in my time at the Bar. The
principal reason, as I see it, is the shyster advertising that our profession is silent about.
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Besides this institution-eroding commonality, such cases also share a
central procedural theme. The reports of such lawyer misdeeds are not
made readily available to the general public as consumer-clients of legal
services in America.9 Rather than being consistently reported in the general
news media, notices of lawyer discipline are published typically in special-
ized bar journals or in court reports, often with anonymity for the miscreant
attorney.' 0 This process makes the information systematically useless to all
but the few, most dedicated aficionados of bar journals.
The TV ads, print ads, and the shocking billboard ads of the ambulance chasers are the
major reasons why the public puts lawyers down with used car dealers.
Letter to Robert A. Guzy, President, Minnesota State Bar Association, as reprinted in part, 50
BENcH & B. Mnr., Mar. 1993, at 5; see also Robert J. Samuelson, I Am a Big Lawyer Basher,
NEwsWEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 62. A recent Ohio newspaper study revealed that only 1% of
20,770 complaints filed against Ohio lawyers between 1987 and 1991 resulted in sanctions,
whereas the ABA reported a 3.23% rate nationally for this activity. Lawyer Complaints Rise 15
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1993, at 6.
9. Even those states that require detailed informational disclosure in one form or another,
such as California, Texas, and Wisconsin, do so in specialized bar association journals, newslet-
ters, and court opinions that are narrowly targeted toward a very specialized audience. To the
extent that the public media report such matters, generally on a hit-or-miss basis, there is some-
what wider distribution to the public. There is no systematic targeting of information to the pres-
ent or future consumers of legal services of disciplined attorneys with the exception of those
jurisdictions, such as Minnesota in recent months, which have adopted the requirement that sus-
pended attorneys send a copy of the disciplinary report to their existing clients explaining why
they will not be able to continue representation during the period of the suspension. See infra
notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
10. The following are a few examples of state reporting methods:
Wisconsin. The publication procedure in Wisconsin rivals California as among the most explicit
and systematic in the nation. The Wisconsin Lawyer, published monthly, sets forth the names and
offense particulars of lawyers who have been disciplined by the Board of Attorneys' Professional
Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The narrative regarding the identity and
findings made against sanctioned attorneys is set forth in detail, including dates, pertinent dollar
amounts, findings of neglect or misfeasance, and other matters-often running to several
paragraphs per sanctioned attorney. For example, the October 1992 edition of the Wisconsin
Lawyer set forth lengthy descriptions of actions regarding five named, suspended and reprimanded
attorneys, together with lengthy descriptions, sometimes of many paragraphs, reciting the particu-
lar violations and details underlying the findings that discipline was required. 65 Wis. LAW., Oct.
1992, at 53, 53-59. In addition, the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys' Professional Responsibility
sends the information published in the Wisconsin Lawyer to the local media in the city or county
where the offending lawyer practices. This increases the chance that local publication may inform
some of the general public. Although the current reports that appear in the Wisconsin Lawyer are
extensive, the amount of detail has been cut back substantially from what used to be printed
because of space limitations. Telephone Interview with Joyce Hastings, staff member (Mar. 19,
1993).
California. The California Lawyer usually publishes the names and case information of all per-
sons who have been disciplined, together with a "discipline key" indicating what the various
disciplinary designations may suggest. See supra note 7.
Texas. The publication procedures in Texas are similar. The Texas Bar Journal publishes
monthly both the names and a paragraph describing the findings of lawyer misconduct (sometimes
including the dollar amount of trust funds or other losses caused to the client), together with the
age of the offender and the duration of any suspension. Pursuant to the Texas rules, the possibility
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The danger signals of the crisis of confidence in lawyers and our legal
institutions are becoming manifest.'1 However, some hopeful possibilities
are emerging that may help to end the erosion of the bar's institutional
credibility with the public while at the same time providing a healthier mar-
ketplace for the consumers of legal services.
As we approach the close of this century, there exists in American law
a confluence of several powerful cultural and judicial tendencies. The dy-
namics of these tendencies increasingly affect the practice of law at all
levels. This Article will explore these tendencies in relation to a concept of
disclosure of both the merits and demerits of lawyer advertising. Second,
this Article will examine the virtues and burdens of establishing a new pol-
icy to end the increasing asymmetry of information in the marketplace for
legal services-a policy of making lawyer disciplinary results readily visi-
of a "private reprimand" where only a general description of the reprimand will be published
without the name of the attorney is available but appears to be limited to offenses of lesser propor-
tions, such as advertising violations or delays and neglect that did not result in major losses to the
client. TEx. R. Disc. P., TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 6.07 (West Sup. 1993). Press releases to local
media are also utilized. Letter from James M. McCormack, General Counsel of the State Bar of
Texas, to Sandra L. DeGraw, co-author (Aug. 5, 1993) (on file with co-author).
Illinois. In Illinois, all investigations are confidential until a complaint has been filed, at which
point the proceedings become public. The supreme court imposes disciplinary sanctions. The
details of the misconduct will be published, if at all, by the court in its opinion. The Illinois Bar
Journal does not publish the systematic disciplinary outcomes. However, a Bar Association
newsletter publishes some of these from time to time on a space-available basis. As a matter of
central reporting, only the Attorney Registration and Discipline Committee's (ARDC) annual re-
port show the statewide statistical data, but this annual report does not contain names of the
lawyers sanctioned nor the details of their violations. Interview with James Grogan, Chief Coun-
sel ARDC (Mar. 19, 1993).
New York. Lawyer discipline is handled by eight regional grievance committees that are not
required to publish the outcomes of the disciplinary matters that they hear. The first and second
departments report their disciplinary matters to the New York Law Journal, but the other six
departments do not. The central office in Albany publishes an annual report that pulls together
statistics from all eight of the grievance committees and disseminates this report upon request.
The New York State Bar Journal (established in 1929) has never published reports on a systematic
basis regarding lawyer discipline actions, according to Jean Gerhardt of the Journal. Telephone
Interview with Jean Gerhart, (Mar. 19, 1993).
Florida. The Florida Bar Journal does not publish the names or descriptions of lawyer discipline
in that state. However, the Bar News (a monthly newspaper published by the Bar Association)
will publish such information as may be received from the courts from time to time. Such publi-
cation is subject to space limitations. Accordingly, not all matters received from the court are
published in the newspaper. Interview with Celia Johnson, Bar Association Staff Member (Mar.
19, 1993).
11. See supra note 8. Establishing programs "of continuous improvement in client percep-
tion of product and service quality" is now a consultant-based industry that seeks to help law firms
retain present clients and enhance their marketing to new clients. Ward Bower, Total Quality
Management in Law Practice-It's Not Just for Business Anymore, 39 PRAc. LAw., Apr. 1993, at
25, 35 (emphasis added). Introduction of business practice and management techniques (e.g.,
"total quality management") into the law firm can sometimes be a positive element, even when it
springs from lawyers' concern for how they are perceived in the marketplace.
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ble to the potential consumer-client.'" Finally, this Article suggests that
other professions and businesses should consider their own disclosure tradi-
tions and follow the lead of a genuinely self-correcting legal profession.
II. THm TRADMON oF INviSIBILITY
[Ble subject to no sight but thine and mine, Invisible to every
eyeball else.
William Shakespeare' 3
The question of whether disciplinary sanctions are visible to the poten-
tial client-consumers of an attorney's services hinges largely upon the ac-
cess such consumers have to the information. From the perspective of
consumer-clients, most lawyer discipline has been invisible, although some
slight movement toward openness has occurred in recent years.14 This very
invisibility serves as the core of the current crisis of confidence in our
self-policing system. True, the days when only bar discipline agencies
(composed solely of attorneys) and the courts knew of lawyer sanctions
have largely faded in most jurisdictions. That is not to say, however, that
the facts concerning charges, procedures, and outcomes of lawyer discipline
matters in America are effectively visible to the public.' 5 They are not, and
12. By way of illustration, few, if any, female clients of Wisconsin attorney Heilprin, see
supra note 4, (notwithstanding the extensive efforts of the Wisconsin Lawyer in printing the de-
tails of disciplinary matters) between the years 1973 and 1992 had effective access to information
concerning his ongoing difficulties with sexual misconduct between himself and female clients,
notwithstanding the fact that these problems were acted upon, from time to time, by the bar disci-
plinary authorities. Gerald C. Steinberg, Dangerous Liaisons: Lawyer Discipline Imposed for
Sexual Misconduct, 66 Wis. LAW., Feb. 1993, at 25-28.
13. WILLTAM SHASPEAE, Tm TEwEsr, act 1, sc. 2, In. 302 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974).
14. As an ABA report recently noted:
The Commission's research convinces us that disciplinary systems are fair to both re-
spondents and complainants, but there is a high level of public distrust. Secret proceed-
ings are the greatest cause of distrust. If public trust is to be promoted, disciplinary
systems can no longer operate secretly. Florida and West Virginia's disciplinary records
are open to the public when a charge is filed or a complaint is dismissed. Oregon's
records are public when a complaint is made. These open disciplinary systems have
proven that lawyers are not harmed by them. Gag rules have already been declared
unconstitutional by a number of courts. Without gag rules confidentiality is no longer
tenable. An open system of discipline will foster greater respect for the integrity of the
system.
REPORT OF THE COMnssIoN ON EVALUATION OF DIsCnPLiNARY ENFORCEMENT TO THE A.B.A. iv
(May 1991) (emphasis added) [hereinafter A.B.A. DiscIPuLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT].
For a discussion of the experiences of a non-lawyer who served on several grievance com-
mittees during a 14-year period, see Virginia Bowers, A Lay Person Looks at Lawyer Discipline,
56 TEx. B.. 75, 76 (1993). For a discussion of visibility and invisibility to the prospective cli-
ent-consumer, see supra note 12.
15. See Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can't Always Get What
They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 283,
306-08 (1992). A trend toward some public scrutiny of the lawyer discipline process exists. At
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the reason for this functional invisibility lies in the methods of dissemina-
tion that are only now evolving.
Among the various states, the current practices of disseminating the
names and details of lawyer discipline range from nonexistent to thoroughly
systematic to randomly hit-or-miss. 16 Some jurisdictions set forth the name
of each disciplined attorney together with extensive descriptions of the case
and the sanctions applied.17 Some reports set forth the names but few de-
tails,'" while others omit names but describe the facts and outcomes of the
disciplinary cases.' 9 Many states provide a mixture of brief, anonymous
reports and detailed information.20 Even among the most active jurisdic-
tions, however, public disciplinary notices are commonly placed in publica-
tions that are not designed to reach the general consuming public. 2' If the
information is published systematically, it is customarily directed only to-
ward bar association members.22
Attorneys contemplating referral of clients to attorneys in different cit-
ies, or even different jurisdictions, would have some basic capacity to use
their research tools to determine whether actual disciplinary sanctions had
been published in the reporter systems concerning the attorneys to whom
present, about two dozen states are now considering opening disciplinary proceedings to the pub-
lic after formal charges have been filed. Randall Sambom, Lawyer Discipline to Open Up, NAT'L
LJ., June 7, 1993, at 3.
16. A current study undertaken by the National Organization for Bar Counsel (NOBC) has
sought to identify the significant items of information that could be made available from the
NOBC data bank as a topic library concerning professional responsibility. Thirty-nine of the 50
state jurisdictions and the District of Columbia responded to the questionnaire. The responses
indicated a mixed quality of publication of disciplinary actions. Even where a court has issued a
formal opinion, the percentage of published discipline cases is not 100%. Moreover, the question
of who should have access to any discipline data bank showed a wide array of opinion, with only a
very small portion responding that either the "public" or "anyone" should have access to the data
(6% at most). RESPONSES TO NOBC WEST QutsnoNNARmE, AMERiCAN BAR AssocIAION, fax
copy dated Mar. 31, 1993 [hereinafter NOBC] (on file at the South Texas College of Law Li-
brary). See Lawyer Discipline Hearing, 76 A.B.A. J. Jan. 1990, at 109, 109. Of the 39 jurisdic-
tions responding, only half required that a lawyer under investigation provide information on all
jurisdictions in which that lawyer held a license to practice law. Id. Accordingly, it is difficult to
envision how information regarding disciplinary matters of an attorney licensed in several juris-
dictions would ever come to be targeted toward future consumer-clients of that attorney in juris-
dictions other than that where the disciplinary action is taking place; for instance, twice-disbarred
attorney Jack Kennedy set the record for filed client grievances in Delaware before his disbarment
there, seven years prior to his Texas disbarment in 1993. See Ruth Piller, LAWYER WHO WAS
HOST OF TELEvIsIoN SHOW Is DiSBARRED, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 27, 1993, at A26.
17. E.g., Florida Bar v. Riskin, 549 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 1989); Professional Discipline, 66
Wis. LAW. 53, 53-55 (Oct. 1992).
18. E.g., Resignation with Discipline Charges Pending, 11 CAL. LAW. 89, 89-95 (Feb. 1991)
(including category of persons who resigned while disciplinary charges were pending).
19. E.g., Private Reprimands, 56 Tax. B.J., Apr. 1993, at 392.
20. For examples from six states, see supra note 10.
21. See supra note 10.
22. See supra note 10.
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their clients are being referred. Such referring attorneys would also have
the ability to engage in research concerning whether disciplinary notifica-
tions had been published in the local bar journals or bar newsletters at the
site of the candidate for referral. Obviously, these tools are incomplete,
cumbersome, and do not consolidate and carry forward the information in a
centralized fashion from year to year.23
To a non-lawyer who is directly seeking counsel to represent her inter-
ests, the information is not available in any targeted, functionally effective
manner. Most prospective consumer-clients will not subscribe to the rele-
vant publications, read the advance sheets, or keep a continuing record. By
definition, they would be unfamiliar with the research tools and unlikely to
know of the various bar journals and newsletters that may or may not sys-
tematically publish notification of disciplinary outcomes. The chance of
stumbling across a pertinent report in the local newspapers is, at most, a
random possibility. Accordingly, it is a premise of this Article that a func-
tional invisibility exists when it comes to giving notice to the cli-
ent-consumer of legal services that a particular attorney has been recently
disciplined or is subject to ongoing sanctions of one form or another.24
One method of increasing discipline visibility for the benefit of cli-
ent-consumers involves attorney advertising. Law firm promotional litera-
ture, very broadly defined, targets the desired market segment of potential
client-consumers. A system of mandates that requires disclosure of disci-
pline data in promotional literature would render disciplinary action more
visible. Any system that imposes restraints upon lawyer advertising, how-
ever, must face certain constitutional questions.
I. CoNsnuT ioNAL DImENsIoNs OF "DIscLosuREz ADVERTISING"
[I]n virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we
have emphasized that... "warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be
appropriately required.., in order to dissipate the possibility of
consumer confusion or deception.
Justice Byron Whitel
23. The West/ABA survey regarding the data base of information for professional responsi-
bility, including the sanctions of particular lawyers in various jurisdictions, indicated that only six
states out of 39 responding believed that the public should have access to the ABA National
Discipline Data Bank through the proposed private file. See NOBC, supra note 16, at 109. Ac-
cordingly, it would appear that there is a very small chance that a private attorney seeking a
lawyer to whom to refer a client, whether in the same or a different jurisdiction, will at any time in
the foreseeable future have available a data bank with the necessary information. See id.
24. See supra note 12.
25. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (quoting In re
R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
Since the mid-seventies, America has experienced a radical departure
from the era in which most lawyer advertising was deemed unacceptable by
the bar. The energizing principles of this evolution, as put in place by the
Supreme Court, are two-fold:
(1) the First Amendment protects lawyers' freedom of commercial
speech,26 and
(2) potential client-consumers have a right to receive factually accu-
rate data in the marketplace.27
The changes in lawyer advertising set in motion by Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona28 and its progeny would astound an attorney or client from the
pre-Bates era awakening in today's world of attorney marketing.29 For ex-
ample, over one-half of the 200 top United States law firms now have
high-salaried, full-time marketing directors/strategic planners on their per-
manent payrolls.30
A. Changing Nature of Lawyer Advertising
Today, lawyers and their law firms seek business-cultivating visibility
and look beyond such age-old activities as the seasonal mailing of holiday
cards, the printing of an occasional advisory newsletter, visible pro bono
26. Before the landmark Bates v. State Bar of Arizona decision of the United States Supreme
Court in 1977, the Court had determined that ".commercial speech" deserved significant constitu-
tional protection under the First Amendment, although such protection did not rise to the level of
political and other non-commercial speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-58 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818
(1975). With this central predicate in place, the Supreme Court, starting with Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, rejected a series of arguments that attorney advertising was not entitled to First Amend-
ment protections consistent with those protections given to other players in the commercial mar-
ketplace. 433 U.S. 350, 367-79 (1977).
27. An ongoing thread throughout the cases indicates a powerful concern of the Supreme
Court that consumers have the benefit of accurate, competitive pricing of legal services and accu-
rate disclosure of specialization areas of lawyer practice. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84. But see id. at
397 (Powell, J., dissenting); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
106, 116-17 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 650, 651.
28. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29. Bruce W. Burton, Rule 11 Sanctions and Lawyer Advertising: A Modest Proposal, 45
ARK. L. R-v. 309, 336 (1992).
30. One analysis of law firm marketing has stated:
Marketing strategies are more than a brochure or newsletter; they are the end result of a
systematic process by which a firm's market is evaluated, targeted and developed.... A
marketing plan should become as much a part of a law firm's practice as the delivery of
legal services.
Arlene Hibschweiler et al., Strategic Marketing Plans: A Reality for Success in Practicing Law,
56 TEXAs BJ., Feb. 1993, at 120. The salaries for directors/strategic planners at the top 200 U.S.
law firms range from $70,000 to $150,000 per year. Carolyn S. Paschal, America's Leading Law
Firms Talk Candidly About Marketing, 54 Tax. BJ., Feb. 1993, at 129, 129 (Feb. 1991).
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activity, or speaking engagements. 3 ' The era has now passed when a law-
yer might join civic clubs or her firm might sponsor an annual cultural or
social function as the sole method of outreach to the marketplace.32 These
time-honored activities seem like the quaint customs of a quiet past when
viewed against the use of modem marketing devices as innovative as any
that Madison Avenue might devise. Regular news mailings; slick promo-
tional brochures; polished television and radio spots; ad campaigns with
multi-media presentations; half-page, three-color advertisements in the yel-
low pages; daily or weekly advertisements in local television guides; direct
mailings; and a cadre of other merchandising techniques are common-
place.33 For example, while traveling through a tiny town in southern Ohio
last year, one of the authors of this article stopped for a hamburger in a
small "mom-and-pop" cafe. Each of the dozens of coffee mugs used in the
restaurant contained advertising in a special silk-screened format-with one
"box" for a local attorney and his private practice and another "box" touting
an attorney who was a candidate for district judge.
34
Since Bates, lawyers are free to use all levels of ingenuity to "sell"
themselves to consumer-clients in the marketplace and to assert their First
Amendment rights. Although these advertisements include bar-mandated
information, often they emphasize positives such as practice specialities,
while leaving any negatives invisible to the consumers. Bar associations
have set standards to police the accuracy of the promotional data flowing to
client-consumers.35 Yet, statements such as one found in Peel v. Attorney
31. Hibschweiler et al., supra note 30.
32. See RicHARD L. ABEL, AimucN LAWYERS 119-22 (1989).
33. During the week of February 23, 1993, one of this article's co-authors received a
brochure from the Institute of Professional Training in Pensacola, Florida, offering video sets of
information on "How to Market Your Law Firm" for $169 per set, plus workbooks for an addi-
tional price. A local television guide was also received that listed, on the pages covering pro-
grams for February 23, 1993, a total of 21 separate ads for law firms seeling clients involved with
divorce, personal injury, criminal law, social security, worker's compensation, slander, sexual
harassment, insurance claim denials, bankruptcy, discrimination or employment termination, tax
problems, immigration, family law, and criminal defense. (Materials on file with the authors.)
Moreover, it is commonplace in Central Missouri for the telephone yellow pages to contain
three-color, half-page lawyer advertisements. Letter from Honorable William Knox, United
States Magistrate, Central District of Missouri (Sept. 16, 1991) (on file with the authors).
34. Photographs of the "Amazing Mug" are on display at South Texas College of Law, and
copies may be obtained from the authors (713/646-1832). The Ohio cafe owner reported that a
California company sends sales representatives through the towns of America making arrange-
ments with local advertisers, including attorneys and judges, to have their literature placed on
coffee mugs, which are then sold in bulk to local restaurants.
35. States vary considerably in the requirements they have established respecting disclaimers
in lawyer advertising. In Arizona, contingency fee advertisements must explicitly state whether
the client will be liable for any costs or expenses; in California, testimonial advertisements must
make an express disclaimer: "This testimonial or endorsement does not constitute a guarantee,
warranty, or prediction regarding the outcome of your legal matter"; in Iowa, public advertise-
ments by lawyers must include a statement that the decision to retain a lawyer should not be based
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Registration & Disciplinary Commission,36 to the effect that "disclosure of
truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution
to [consumer] decisionmaking than is concealment of such information," 37
are at most half-truths. The negative but critically important information
concerning disciplinary sanctions and other ethical difficulties that have al-
ready been determined is indeed concealed from such advertising. Lauda-
tory as they might appear, proposals to vastly broaden the information that
lawyers may include in their business advertising will not ameliorate the
lack of "demerit" data.38 The call now is for adoption of a new principle,
"disclosure advertising"--full and fair disclosure of information aimed at
responding to public concerns about lawyer misconduct. 39 More specifi-
cally, the term "disclosure advertising" means a requirement that an attor-
ney who has been sanctioned or disciplined for serious misconduct must
carry information concerning such sanction or discipline in his advertising
materials.
B. Constitutional Challenges
Disclosure advertising is premised in part upon the idea that a more
fully informed marketplace will be more economically efficient. In an in-
creasingly information-driven era, such a change seems consistent with cul-
tural and marketplace forces of considerable vitality. A move toward
requiring greater visibility of lawyer discipline or trial court sanctions
would be controversial, however, because it might be seen as a threatening
departure from the status quo.'
Any attempt by the courts to mandate the disclosure of attorney disci-
plinary offenses as part of lawyer advertising must satisfy certain constitu-
tional necessities. Currently, the very limited levels of disclosure of
solely upon the advertisements; South Carolina, ironically, requires a disclaimer on advertising to
potential clients that they may obtain information about competing lawyers, whom they may wish
to retain other than the advertising lawyer, by consulting the Yellow Pages or by calling a toll-free
number for the South Carolina Bar Lawyer Referral Service. ABA/BNA, LAws. MAN. ON PROF.
CoNDucr § 81:405 (1989).
36. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
37. Id. at 108, 116-17.
38. See, e.g., Morton, supra note 15, at 295, 325-27.
39. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text for some examples. Ringing through the
concept of disclosure advertising is the Jeffersonian notion that one of the pillars of individual
autonomy in a free society is dependable information about matters of significance that affect each
individual. See Colin Benwick, Thomas Jefferson: Pragmatist or Visionary?, 43 Hisr. TODAY,
Apr. 1993, at 18, 19.
40. The recent NOBC polling of various jurisdictions of disciplinary authorities indicates a
strong reluctance to make information available to members of the general public or "anyone who
wants it"; these results indicate a strong and continuing reluctance to allow publication of matters
affecting the practice of law from a potentially adverse viewpoint to grow beyond current limita-
tions. See NOBC, supra note 16.
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suspension, disbarment, and other sanctions published in the West reporters
or the various state bar journals have not generated any successful constitu-
tional challenges. 4 Moreover, a cluster of significant social policies, some
of them constitutional, argue strongly in favor of full and fair dissemination
of information. These policies include such varied matters as decisions per-
mitting the press and the public to attend criminal trials42 or sealing off case
records from public review.43 In many areas apart from the practice of law,
there are instances when government regulations have mandated the disclo-
sure of unpleasant facts. For example, disclosure requirements are imposed
upon: (1) tobacco,4" alcohol,4 5 and gambling; 46 (2) medications that have
been licensed for release to the consuming public by the FDA;47 (3) de-
scription of credit terms pursuant to banking laws;48 and (4) information
required by certain safety and environmental statutes.49 Accordingly, there
41. This is not surprising. Generally, the court of highest appellate jurisdiction in each state
controls the ultimate determination of sanctions being imposed upon lawyers found to have vio-
lated ethical standards within the jurisdiction. These opinions are frequently published in the
reporters. Implicit in this practice is the courts' determination that the publication of the names
and details of these disciplinary matters is not a violation of any constitutional principle.
42. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980) (holding that members
of the public and the press have a constitutional right to attend criminal trials).
43. Woven Electronics Corp. v. Advance Group, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1439, 1443 (4th Cir.
1991) (per curiam) (requiring that even in a trade secrets case, the court should not seal the entire
record; rather, the court should review the record and seal only the necessary portions).
44. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D.D.C. 1971).
45. Dunagin v. Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259
(1984).
46. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331
(1986).
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988).
48. At least 20 statutory and regulatory truth-in-lending disclosure programs are published
for institutional use by Kenneth F. Hall. KRNNmm H F. HALL, 1992-93 MORTGAGE LOAN DiscLo-
SURE HANDBOOK 4 (1992).
49. A Texas court ordered a man who destroyed wetlands to erect and maintain a billboard
identifying to passersby that he is remediating the environmental damage caused by his fill and
construction. Kevin Moran, Man Ordered to Advertise His Penance for Harming Wetlands,
HousTrON CHRON., Apr. 1, 1993, at A30; see also Richard A. Dennis, Federal Criminal Liability
and Ethical Considerations, S. Tax. CoLL. OF LAw E1avmoN. Lrr. PRoG. (Jan. 1990).
Apart from an occasional judge-made requirement for disclosure advertising, such as the
wetlands disruption contractor described above, most of the regulations upon commercial speech
have been legislative. A variety of powers exists, including the power under the Commerce
Clause and general state and federal protections of health, safety, and welfare, which would allow
for the command that reasonable disclosures be made in such targeted advertising. In the instance
of the practicing lawyer, however, the jurisdiction principally vests in those courts that have li-
censed the lawyer or the individual court before whom the lawyer appears. Accordingly, rather
than looking to such things as the Commerce Clause to empower such regulatory disclosures, one
must look to the inherent power of the judiciary to license, regulate, supervise, sanction, and
control all those who have been authorized to appear before the bar. See generally CHARLES W.
WotRAmu, MODERN LEGAL ETmIcs § 2.2 (1986) (discussing the "inherent powers of courts to
regulate lawyers"). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recently determined that lawyers' busi-
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appears to be an existing body of policy that militates in favor of disclosure
advertising, at least in certain narrowly targeted areas.
Beyond such general policy matters, a valid constitutional basis must
be found for singling out lawyers as a proper classification for such an
intrusive proposal. Society has not yet adopted a system that would require
furniture retailers to notify consumers-in their weekend television com-
mercials hawking discounts on dining room sets-that official consumer
agencies have registered numerous administrative complaints against the
sponsoring furniture dealer." Similarly, deceptive contractors in the home
renovation industry are not required to inform prospective customers that
their ratings with the local Better Business Bureaus are dismal, at best.
There exists no historical tradition in the American system of market-
ing that mandates a full disclosure of the prior business practices, warts and
all, to the prospective consumer. Thus, those opposed to disclosure could
assert what is essentially an equal protection argument and urge that the
business of practicing law ought not to be singled out for a special burden
not applicable to other businesses generally. The key analysis in this regard
would be whether there are valid grounds to distinguish between lawyers
and individuals engaged in other commercial ventures.
Without addressing the question of imposing a regimen of disclosure
advertising upon all retailers and service-providers throughout the nation, it
is possible to draw some valid distinctions between lawyers and other
groups:
1. Access to the administration of justice (including the final adjudi-
cation of all fundamental rights flowing from our constitutional system) is
achieved through the unique monopoly afforded lawyers. 1 Lawyers are
granted licenses from the courts that make the profession the sole medium
of access (except the pro se amateur) through which a private citizen or
business entity may seek to utilize the American system of justice. 2 Seek-
ing the vindication of any and all private rights, pursuant to contract, tort,
property, or special statutory grants, as well as the presentation of all de-
fenses against the loss of civil rights and liberties pursuant to criminal pro-
visions, are within the exclusive province of lawyers. This special
empowerment is accompanied by a special array of ancillary powers for the
use of subpoena, demanding of deposition, and other discovery, all under
ness-seeking efforts can be more stringently regulated than those of CPAs. See Edenfield v. Fane,
113 S. Ct. 1792, 1802-03 (1993).
50. Even furniture dealers deal with truth-in-lending disclosures to the extent that certain
closed-end credit purchases are promoted. 15 U.S.C. § 1602, 1631-46 (1988).
51. WoLFRAM, supra note 49, at 25-27.
52. Id. at 27-3 1. It is essentially the power sometimes referred to as "negative inherent pow-
ers," whereby the courts can prevent legislative action that would permit all citizens to be admit-
ted to the practice of law without any examination or other prerequisite. Id.
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the aegis of, and with access to, the coercive powers of the state. Such
far-reaching empowerment does not inhere to licensed auto dealers, psychi-
atrists, or restauranteurs.53
2. The bias for disclosure is now embedded in judicial thought,54
which recognizes the existence of a powerful societal interest in deterring
false or misleading advertising and protecting the public through warnings
or disclaimers." Moreover, there appears to be a nationwide consensus
through the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to deter unjustified ex-
pectations and to avoid, in communications between attorneys and prospec-
tive clients, any misleading implication because the communication
"contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact neces-
sary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially mislead-
ing. '56 Moreover, if a sufficiently compelling public interest exists to
53. The Preamble to the ABA's 1991 amended Model Rules of Professional Conduct recog-
nizes the uniqueness of lawyers:
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professionals also
have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this
respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of
government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ulti-
mate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the
occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the
legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal
profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent
on government for the right to practice.
ABA/BNA, LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CoNuucr § 01:101 (1989).
54. In Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), the United
States Supreme Court overturned the censure of an Illinois attorney whose professional letterhead
indicated that he had been certified as a trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy
and that he was licensed as an attorney in three states. A sharply divided Supreme Court deter-
mined that accurate, factual advertising is not misleading, and the opinion seemed to have been
influenced by the "presumption favoring disclosure over concealment." Id. at 109-10. It would
seem to follow that if disclosure of positive, truthful characteristics that enhance the lawyer's
reputation cannot be prohibited by the attorney disciplinary committees of the states, in the inter-
est of protecting the client-consumer of legal services, then disclosure of factually correct but
unflattering information would be equally attractive under this same principle. See also Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651-52 n.14 ("The right of a
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not such a funda-
mental right [as to require a strict scrutiny test.]").
55. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
56. LAws. MAN. OF PROF. CoNDuter § 01:167 (ABA/BNA 1989) (emphasis added). Rule
7.1 also indicates that other prohibited communications include the creation of unjustified expec-
tations as to results or invidious comparisons between the advertising lawyer's services and other
lawyers' services that cannot be factually substantiated. Id. Anti-barratry efforts have recently
been publicized in Texas through news conferences and the creation of a toll-free number for the
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require a licensed drug manufacturer 7 to disclose information about ad-
verse side effects to the user, it follows a fortiori that a licensed "Rambo"
litigator could be required by the court to disclose a trail of Rule 11 sanc-
tions that might adversely affect his client.58
3. Historically, lawyers as a class are licensed, monitored, and disci-
plined by the courts.59 At the outset, the very inquiry whether the courts
possess the power to impose a disclosure advertising regimen upon the legal
profession presents a quaint paradox. After all, the branch of government
that will determine any equal protection, due process, or free speech issues
will necessarily be the same branch that will make the policy judgment to
impose disclosure advertising on lawyers.60
Another issue that must be addressed is the constitutional hurdle posed
by First Amendment protections of free speech. After Bates, there is no
question that advertising by lawyers is a protected form of free speech.61
The significant question is whether lawyer advertising is so highly pro-
tected that it cannot be regulated in the fashion proposed.
Existing First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that commercial
speech may be regulated.6' Regulations pass constitutional muster if there
are substantial public interests at stake in the regulation.63 Such regulations
will be valid when the restrictions created upon lawyer advertising are of no
broader scope than reasonably necessary to achieve the ends of protecting
public to report improper solicitations. Texas State Bar Update (April 1993); Meeting the Candi-
dates, 56 TEx. B.J., April 1993, at 360.
57. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
58. See infra text accompanying note 130.
59. WoLFRAM, supra note 49, § 2.2; see, e.g., Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325, 330
(Utah 1943).
60. WoLnRAM, supra note 49, at 23.
61. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Peel v. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 637 (1985); see also Terry Calvani et al., Attorney Advertising and Competition at the
Bar, 41 VAND. L. REv. 761, 768-69 (1988).
62. In Zauderer, the Supreme Court recognized the "material differences between disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions [on lawyer advertising]." 471 U.S. at 650. This case also
expressly approved certain Ohio Bar regulations that required inclusion of the material facts con-
cerning contingent fee arrangements in lawyer advertising that indicated contingent fees were
available. Id. At least one state court has held that failure by an attorney to communicate mate-
rial information in his advertisements and other business solicitations renders such communica-
tions false and misleading. Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 437, 441-42 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991). Inherent in both decisions is an emphasis on the
rights of prospective clients to make a more informed choice when selecting an attorney.
63. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; accord Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749 (1976).
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the substantial public interest.' The consumer-client's welfare is just such
a public interest.
6 -
For disclosure advertising to withstand constitutional challenge, a dis-
tinction must be made between those regulations upon lawyer advertising
that forbid certain claims from being made (i.e., exclusions) and those regu-
lations that require appropriate disclosures or disclaimers (i.e., inclusions).
An outright prohibition against lawyer advertising is much less likely to
pass constitutional muster than a rule requiring inclusion of all facts neces-
sary to make the advertising more valuable to consumers. For example, in
response to an Ohio bar rule requiring inclusion of a wide variety of facts
concerning lawyers' contingent fee arrangements in attorney advertising,
the United States Supreme Court in Zauderer engaged in a balancing ap-
proach that tilted in favor of the consumer.66 The Zauderer Court decided
that requiring attorneys to provide somewhat more information than they
might otherwise be inclined to present, particularly information clarifying
fee arrangements, presents them with only a slight burden.67
In the Peel case of 1990, a sharply divided Court held that information
on an attorney's professional letterhead indicating that he had been certified
for trial specialization by the National Board of Trial Advocacy was accept-
able because such information was supported by the notion that it was not
misleading and was accurate, factual data s.6  By extension, if disclosure of
meritorious characteristics pertaining to the attorney's capacity to represent
clients in a satisfactory fashion is permitted in his advertising because it is
accurate and factual, then it would seem equally persuasive that the presen-
tation of unflattering information regarding the attorney's disciplinary rec-
ord can be mandated for disclosure to the consumer-client when factually
accurate.69
Beyond the focus upon consumer protection described above, there ex-
ists a public policy question concerning the continued effectiveness of the
administration of justice in a climate of growing mistrust and hostility to-
64. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84; see also Peel, 496 U.S. at 107.
65. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-51. The interest at stake may be high enough, e.g., where a
state by regulation attempts to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess ... their faith therein." West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); accord Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717
(1977); Miami Herald Publishing, Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
66. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650. Notably, the Zauderer Court determined that it is neither
impractical nor burdensome to require the weeding out of false and misleading advertising by
attorneys and that disclosures, including warnings or disclaimers, are appropriate in the interest of
protecting the public; requiring attorneys to provide only somewhat more information than they
might otherwise be inclined to present to the public is not an undue burden. Id. at 646 n.13.
67. Id. at 652-53 n.15.
68. Peel 496 U.S. at 110.
69. See supra note 54.
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ward legal institutions generally and lawyers specifically.70 Some observ-
ers believe that America is passing through a growing climate of distrust
accompanied by some features of a progressing civil dissolution.7" An in-
dispensable element enabling cooperation among citizens at every level-
social trust-can be lost. A fear exists that the population can "become
resigned to a society in which taking advantage of others when one can is
standard and accepted behavior."72 Similar comments about the erosion of
basic public trust in the structures of society over recent years have been
widespread.7" The wave of state high court promulgations of a proposed
"lawyer's creed" is only one indication of the grievous magnitude of the
perceived disintegration of the image of the legal profession.74 Unfortu-
nately, surveys and independent studies appear to verify this decline. 75 At
some point, the broad social consequences of a downward spiral in the pub-
lic perception of courts and judicial administration will have major implica-
tions for all of American culture.
76
No court weighing the need for tangible reform of the bar can turn its
back complacently on certain existing risks. 77 Recall for a moment that in
the last forty years, courts have often supplanted both the legislative and the
executive branches as the agent of ultimate social and cultural change.78
Simultaneously, legislatures and bureaucrats have seen public trust and con-
70. Notably, University of North Carolina Law School Professor Bumele Powell, Chair of
the ABA Committee on Professional Discipline, regards this crisis of confidence as directly linked
to the need for "ordinary morality" in the relationship between the Bar and the consuming client
public. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
71. See ViRGmA HELD, RIoTS AND GOODS JUSYING SOCIAL ACrION 62-63 (1984).
72. Id. The New York State Bar Journal recently reported that more than 40 jurisdictions had
adopted a version of the Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism. "It is appropriate for every lawyer to
consider in this time of concern about the legal profession's public image." Profiles in Profes-
sionalism, 64 N.Y. ST. BJ., Jan. 1992, at 45, 48 (emphasis added).
73. See supra text accompanying note 1; infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 72.
75. See infra notes 79.
76. Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role
requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.
77. The late Robert B. McKay, when he chaired the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, warned of one significant risk: "If the disciplinary process does not
meet [an acceptable] standard, a disaffected public is likely to impose limits upon the process
." McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at iii.
78. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 236-37 (1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Sir Sidney William Templeman has
remarked on the manner in which the current challenges of society have progressed further by way
of case law in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Sir Sidney William Templeman, An
English View of the Judicial Function, in LEGAL INsTrrtMoNs TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES COMPARED 7 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1977).
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fidence in their institutions plummet.7 9 Thus, if the bench and bar of
America are unable to shore up their eroding claims to public trust and
confidence, then the institution that has become most vital to the function-
ing of a society based on law is called into question. 0 Loss of public trust
and confidence eventually could prove to be socially seismic.
IV. COURT SANCTIONS AND DIscLosuRE ADVERTISING
[Plaintiffs' counsel conducted the litigation in a manner that es-
calated costs unnecessarily and vexatiously.... The Court does
not hold plaintiffs blameless. This was their litigation, and their
counsel must be deemed to have acted at their direction.
U.S. District Judge George F. Gunn, Jr.
(levying $100,000 in sanctions on
counsel and their clients)"1
Two major sources of demerit information exist that could be required
elements of lawyer advertising. First and most obvious-needing little ex-
planation-are suspensions, reprimands, disbarments, and the like imposed
through the lawyer discipline agencies in each jurisdiction. These are ulti-
mately enforced by the power of the judicial branch to control the admis-
sion to, and to regulate the practice of, law. 2 There are, however, also
classic sources of demerit information to be derived from direct control
over attorneys appearing before a judicial tribunal that are grounded in
court rules, statutes, or the inherent powers of the courts.8 3
One of the key signals that law has been evolving from a profession to
a commodity is from this second source-the increasing judicial control
79. Some polls show that the confidence that the public has in lawyers and its respect for the
legal profession is at the same low level as that of Congress and below that enjoyed by many other
professional organizations. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMEucAN LAWYER 163 (1989); Mary Lahr Schier,
Lawyers' Image: What's to be Done?, BENCH & B. MiNN. 16 (Mar. 1993); see also Altman et al.,
supra note 8, at 1-12; Robert J. Samuelson, I Am a Big Lawyer Basher, NEwSWEEK, Apr. 27,
1992, at 62; Sherman E. Stock & Nancy M. Rottier, Cronkite's Back... and It's Bad News for
Civil Justice, Wis. AcAD. TRIAL. LAW. (1992).
80. In effect, the question of disciplinary visibility has already been answered in a general
fashion. Significant activity within the bar presently exists to bring the process of disciplinary
proceedings more closely to public scrutiny, sometimes through the admission of lay members on
the disciplinary committees and the acknowledged problem that "secrecy and discipline proceed-
ings [continue] to be the greatest single source of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary systems."
A.B.A. DiscipLiaNY ENFORCEmENT REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-26 (May 1991). Also, the
movement in Oregon and other jurisdictions for greater emphasis on the informational needs of
the client-consumer in the selection of counsel is becoming widely noticed. Id. at 23-24.
81. Bastien v. R. Rowland & Co., 116 F.R.D. 619, 621 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
82. See WoLFRPAM, supra note 49, at 22-32.
83. E.g., United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (2d Cir.
1991). The inherent power of the court is so broad as to justify huge monetary awards against a
party for fraud, "lying to the court," and similar justice-blocking conduct. Chambers v. Nasco,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2133 (1991).
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over wildcat litigation tactics that has swept through the state and federal
courts.84 Judges have identified a "rogue's gallery"85 of improper practices
and have greatly fortified the judicial powers to combat such tactics.86 In
addition to the courts' inherent power to levy sanctions against improper
lawyer conduct (including seven-digit awards against a party for lying to
the court and fraud), statutes and court rules also authorize a vast array of
sanctions against abusive litigators and their clients.87 Chief among these
judicial powers stand amended federal Rule 11 and its state counterparts. 88
The reinvigoration of the courts' sanctioning power is a direct re-
sponse to a perceived rising tide of litigation abuses. For example, some
law firms that engaged in plaintiff's litigation on a "Rambo" level began to
initiate a "collective-farm" approach by serving complaints indiscriminately
upon any potential defendants just because their names were found in the
local yellow pages.89 Other firms began the practice of soliciting large
numbers of potential plaintiffs arising out of catastrophes with blizzards of
letters, brochures, newspaper advertisements, and other contacts.90 In retal-
iation, defense counsel began filing foundationless pleadings and endless,
often irrelevant, discovery demands. 91 Judicial concern became revulsion,
and amended Rule 11 sanctions arose in federal courts, while many states
adopted local counterparts to Rule 11 for reasons largely identical to those
84. E.g., Viola Sportswear Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (awarding
attorney's fees after motion for summary judgment granted without opposition following filing of
trademark infringement suit after one pair of $10 jeans sold-without reasonable inquiry as to
allegations); Miller v. Schweikart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (naming parties in
blunderbuss fashion as defendants in class action securities fraud without an attempt by the plain-
tiffs attorney to confirm hearsay or rumors before commencement of suit). As one example of
the 40 jurisdictions that have recently promulgated a lawyer's creed to stem the tide of improper
conduct, see Transmittal Letter from the Honorable Eugene A. Cook to the lawyers of Texas (Dec.
22, 1989), accompanying THE StWREME COURT OF TEXAS AND THE CoURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS,
THE TEXAS LAwYERs' CEEXD-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (1989). A Model Creed of
Professionalism follows similar lines. MODEL STANDARDS § 01:401 (ABA/BNA ed. 1988).
For both entertainment and insight, see the Oklahoma County Bar Association's Lawyer's
Creed, as referenced in a particularly jolly jeremiad by U.S. District Judge Wayne E. Alley in
Krueger v. Pelican Prod. Corp., No. CIV-87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 1989).
85. Crigler v. Pennzoil Co., 687 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 875 F.2d 307 (2d
Cir. 1989).
86. See WALrE K. OLsoN, THE LIIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEAsHED THE LAWSUIT 323 (1991).
87. See supra note 83; Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App,
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991).
88. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
89. OLsoN, supra note 86, at 323.
90. E.g., Musslewhite, 786 S.W.2d at 439-40.
91. One survey of federal judges determined that approximately 40% of all Rule 11 sanctions
are being placed upon defendant's counsel with 60% on plaintiff's. Elizabeth C. Wiggins &
Thomas Willging, Rule 11 Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 47 Comments to p. 8 No. 33 (1992).
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of the federal judiciary.92 Although Rule 11 and its state counterparts have
received the lion's share of attention in recent years, there are also statutory
powers and inherent powers of the court that can lead to discipline and
sanctions.93
By 1993, at least forty states had also adopted some version of a "law-
yer's creed." 94 As one state supreme court justice stated in a letter to the
bar accompanying the distribution of such a creed: "Lawyers with this
[Rambo] attitude instead of being part of the solution have become part of
the problem. Lawyers want to restore civility to the courtroom, to the dis-
covery process, and to the entire practice of law."95
In an effort to control the destructive tide, the federal courts have been
refining and enforcing Rule 11 with ingenuity and vigor.96 The principal
purpose of amended Rule 11 is to deter the filing of frivolous litigation, use
of time-wasting, cost-escalating tactics, and similar practices. 97 Field stud-
ies of the federal courts since 1983 indicate that most judges view deter-
rence as the primary goal of amended Rule 11.9s Accordingly, they have
sought to design and impose the least severe sanctions that are compatible
with deterring future lawyer misconduct in the courts. 99 Moreover, there
has been a shift in focus recently toward the imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
92. E.g., TExAs R. Civ. P. 13, 125.
93. Federal courts have traditionally enjoyed three bases for imposing sanctions, namely Fed-
eral Rule 11, 28 U.S.C § 1927 (1988), and the general inherent powers in the federal system. The
chief attraction of Rule 11 is its authorization to sanction clients of abusive counsel as well as the
counsel themselves and its enhanced flexibility since the 1983 amendments. United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1343-45 (2d Cir. 1991).
94. See supra note 84; infra note 95.
95. THE SUrPREME CoURT OF TEXAS AND Ta COURT OF CRmIINAL APPEALS, THm TEXAs
LAWYERS' CREED--A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (Nov. 7, 1989), accompanying Transmit-
tal Letter from Justice Eugene Cook to the lawyers of Texas (Dec. 22, 1989), supra note 84, at 1.
A Model Creed of Professionalism promulgated by the ABA follows similar lines. MODEL STAN-
DARDS § 01:401 (ABA/BNA ed., 1988).
96. See THOMAS E. WLLOiNG, THm RULE 11 SANCrIONNG PROCESS 11-12 (1988). A key
element of the proposed revision to Rule 11 is a 21-day cure period (a "safe harbor" provision)
during which offending counsel may remedy the violation and avoid further sanctions. See Sam
D. Johnson et al., The Least Severe Sanction Adequate: Reversing the Trend in Rule 11 Sanctions,
54 Tax. BJ. 952, 952 (1991).
The courts' continuing determination to play a strong role in using Rule 11 is made strikingly
clear from the recently formulated Supreme Court doctrine that even where the trial court is found
to lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, it retains the power to impose Rule 11 sanctions.
The trial court enjoys this power notwithstanding the seeming paradox that the basis of the Rule
11 sanction might be the court's determination that the plaintiff's claim was of a frivolous nature.
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076, 1079-81 (1992); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Commit-
tee's Note (1983) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Note]; William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions
Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985).
97. WILLGING, supra note 96, at 20, 30.
98. Id. at 22-23, 30.
99. But see Johnson et al., supra note 96, at 952 (noting that the "least severe sanctions"
standard of Rule 11 application has been effective). For a concise litigator's update on the current
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tions not only on plaintiff's counsel but also upon defense counsel who may
have engaged in inappropriate pleadings and other tactics."° Rule 11 sanc-
tions are imposed not merely for the filing of frivolous pleadings, but in
instances when a litigator, with or without her client, persists with baseless
claims, fails to follow the federal rules, or engages in other conduct inimical
to the efficient functioning of the judicial process. 10 1
Amended Rule 11 is also intended to provide compensation to the
abused party, and studies have indicated that the customary measuring stick
in this approach has been attorneys' fees.' 02 Naturally, an award of attor-
neys' fees is often inadequate compensation to a victimized party, because
it does not compensate for any intangibles such as harassment, harm, added
business costs, or emotional trauma associated with the inappropriate con-
duct of opposing counsel.0 3 Thus, some courts have adopted the imposi-
tion of substantial monetary sanctions in excess of that needed to deter
further litigation misconduct by the offending party."w
Unlike some of the state counterparts to Rule 11, the federal judiciary
is required to take the initiative and sua sponte unmask prohibited tactics
that violate the spirit of Rule 11.105 The concerns for the integrity and effi-
ciency of the system of justice have led toward the increasing use of imagi-
native sanctions in checking such abuses of the court system. Disclosure
advertising, with its deterrent effect, however, has not yet been used by the
federal courts.
status of Rule 11, see Thomas Fraser & Laurie Miller, Costs of Aggression: An Update on Rule
11, 50 BENCH & B. MwN., Apr. 1993, at 25, 28.
100. See supra note 91.
101. Crigler v. Pennzoil Co., 687 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y 1988), affd, 875 F.2d 307 (2d
Cir. 1989); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental il. Corp., 113 F.R.D. 637, 642 n.15 (N.D.
11. 1987); see also Community Elec. Serv. of Los Angeles, Inc. v. National Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 869 F.2d 1235, 1241-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989) (denying Rule 11
sanctions because competent counsel could form a reasonable belief that pleading was warranted
by existing law); Mercury Serv., Inc. v. Allied Bank, 117 F.R.D. 147, 155-57 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd, 907 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1990) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing of paper lacking factual
foundation and intending to mislead court); Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 29-30.
102. E.g., Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that in imposing attorney fees as sanctions under Rule 11, a court should consider the
amount of time reasonably needed to defend against frivolous claims); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d
1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding when sanctions imposed in a Rule 41(b) case, lack of preju-
dice to defendant should be considered); see Schwarzer, supra note 96, at 201.
103. Knox, supra note 33.
104. Wn.LGING, supra note 96, at 30. Recent amendments to Rule 11 would target more
narrowly monetary sanctions toward deterrence and would create a safe harbor rule in which an
attorney may cure certain types of tactical misconduct within 21 days. Id.
105. One recent study showed that federal judges acting sua sponte were responsible for 2% to
7% of all Rule 11 motions/orders. Wiggins & Willging, supra note 91, § IA, at 5 (1992).
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A. Deterrence and Disclosure Advertising
In applying Rule 11, federal judges have been concerned with the need
to devise nonmonetary sanctions that will deter the undesirable conduct.
This has resulted in fourteen or fifteen types of sanctions 10 6 that are applied
within the discretion of the federal trial court.1"7 These sanctions may be
imposed upon both the wildcat attorneys and their clients. Of these sanc-
tions, only a couple go toward compensating the victim, and the vast major-
ity are targeted to have an impact upon the present or future conduct of the
instant wildcat litigator and to deter others from similar practices. °1 s Fed-
eral courts have dismissed frivolous claims and enjoined further litigation
on these claims under the threat of imposing further sanctions. 109 In addi-
tion, "censure, suspension, or disbarment from practicing before the forum
court" are among the particularly stringent sanctions available. 1 0 The prin-
cipal guideline continues to be that a sanction imposed under Rule 11
should be "limited to what is sufficient to deter comparable conduct by
persons similarly situated," thus reducing the need for future sanctions in
other cases or further sanctions in the pending case."'
Under present practices, the wildcat litigator runs the risk of wide-
spread publicity for his violations only under a very limited set of circum-
stances. Naturally, it is within the power of the courts to disseminate, by
issuance of a press release or other communication to selected media or to
106. American Bar Association, Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101, 124 (1988) [hereinafter ABA Standards and
Guidelines]; William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1020 (1988);
Timothy B. Phelps, Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial Restraint, 26 WAsHnBUN LJ. 337,
348-51 (1987). Many of the sanctions include censure, dismissing the cause of action, and issuing
disbarment complaints. It is significant in this regard that some have concluded that both the
consuming public and the bar benefit when the full light of public access to disciplinary informa-
tion is made available. A.B.A. DISCipLiNARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 14, at 23-26; see
also WLLGING, supra note 96, at 5, 12-13.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The amendment to Rule 11, adopted by the Supreme Court on April
22, 1993, places some restraints on the imposition of sanctions, particularly for discovery disputes.
The amendments also required that the imposition of monetary sanctions awarded in the Court's
initiative be preceded by show cause orders. NAT'L L.J., June 7, 1993, at S1-S2.
108. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11
Advisory Committee's Note); see also WILLING, supra note 96, at 11. In the Willging study,
more than one-third of the attorneys interviewed reported a change in pleading practice by: (1)
elimination of overstatement in pleadings; (2) avoidance of boilerplate answers and defenses; and
(3) deflation or elimination of inflated damage requests. WILLGING, supra note 96, at 11. As
standards for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions have evolved, some of the initial confusion about
the exact legal standard necessary to trigger such a sanction is emerging: "Deterrence of sanction-
able behavior depends not only on clear guidelines for attorney behavior, but also on dissemina-
tion of information. On this score, the educational effects of Rule 11 are palpable." Id. at 12. See
also Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 26-27.
109. E.g., Haugen v. Sutherlin, 804 F.2d 490, 491 (8th Cir. 1986).
110. ABA Standards and Guidelines, supra note 106, at 124.
111. WnLLm'jo, supra note 96, at 30; see also Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 25-28.
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the general media, an announcement regarding the imposition of sanctions
upon the rule-violating attorney or his client. 112 Although this is sometimes
done, only a remote chance exists that the information will be effectively
disseminated to current or future clients of the particular attorney in ques-
tion. 113 A second possibility is that the violation will be significant enough
to require the court to proceed to a level of formal disciplinary action, per-
haps even resulting in suspension or disbarment." 4 Here again, however,
information regarding suspension, disbarment, and other discipline is hap-
hazardly disseminated to the public and can usually be found only in spe-
cialized bar publications." 5 Naturally, there is some deterrent value even
in such limited visibility-the offending attorney may risk losing future cli-
ent referrals from other attorneys who happen to read of the disciplinary
matter. A remote risk also exists that present or future clients will learn of
the matter; for example, corporate clients whose in-house counsel come
across a notice of discipline in a bar journal or newsletter may become
aware of the sanctions. Any deterrent effect is even less likely in those
jurisdictions that do not publish the names of offenders or details of the
sanctions.
The possibility of real impact is further diminished by the sequential
method of such disclosures. Even in a jurisdiction such as Wisconsin,
where highly detailed discussions of ethical violations and the sanctions
imposed on a named attorney are published in the Wisconsin Lawyer," 6 the
deterrent effect is fleeting at best, since the reports are not carried cumula-
tively from month to month or year to year.
Under Federal Rule 11, the particular attorney's history of prior sanc-
tions needs to be available for consideration by his prospective clients, be-
cause any future court determination about imposing financial sanctions for
a violation would include this history. 117 A prospective client should real-
ize that both her case and her pocketbook are at risk. Any monetary sanc-
112. ABA Standards & Guidelines, supra note 106, at 122-25.
113. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
114. ABA Standards & Guidelines, supra note 106, at 124.
115. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 10.
117. The ABA Standards specifically state that factors which should be included in a determi-
nation to impose monetary sanctions require the court to examine the "experience, reputation and
ability of the attorneys." ABA Standards & Guidelines, supra note 106, at 126 (emphasis added).
In order to assess any lawyer's reputation under such circumstances, a court would need to inquire
into that lawyer's prior history of Rule 11 sanctions. Examining such a history is part of the
"reputation" inquiry. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 573 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (citing Schwarzer, supra note 96, at 201), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Itel
Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (imposing heavy sanctions on plaintiffs
counsel based in part on his "history in this type of litigation"), aft'd, 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
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tions could become joint and several; l1 8 nonmonetary sanctions might have
significant adverse impact upon the client's case itself." 9 Accordingly, in-
formation about the prior history of sanctions needs to be available to a
potential client during the attorney selection process.1
20
Notably, our research has uncovered no jurisdiction that presently ac-
cumulates disciplinary information about a specific lawyer and publishes
such information in a form designed to come to the attention of the lawyer's
existing clients or potential future clients. The closest analogy to such a
circumstance is the procedure in some jurisdictions, such as Minnesota,
which requires the disciplined attorney to notify existing clients by letter of
any disciplinary suspension and, by recent amendment, to supply such cli-
ents with a copy of the disciplinary order itself.'2 ' The new Minnesota rule
requiring enclosure of the disciplinary order clearly responds to the need for
client-targeted disclosures and illustrates the perceived force of their deter-
rent effect.'22 If this limited Minnesota rule has deterrent effect, visualize
the enormity of the deterrent effect of a national disclosure advertising visi-
bility requirement. Disclosure advertising would target information about
all disciplinary matters toward prospective as well as existing clients.2 '
B. Disclosure Advertising as an Additional Nonmonetary Sanction
The federal courts include "targeted dissemination of decisions impos-
ing sanctions (e.g., to colleagues or a client)" among the nonmonetary en-
forcement tools at a court's disposal.' 4 This is so in part because the
118. United States v. Allen L. Wright Dev. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (N.D. IM. 1987).
119. See Valle v. Taylor, 587 F. Supp. 514,518 (D.N.D. 1984) (dismissing claims under Rules
11, 16, and 41(b)). The 1983 Advisory Committee did not favor the use of Rule 1 l's authority to
deal with claims on the merits. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); see also Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 27 (outlining pro-
posed amendments to Rule 11).
120. The client is at risk to be damaged by a Rule 11 sanction imposed because her counsel
engaged in "shoddy legal analysis." Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1991).
Knowledge of a lawyer's previous Rule 11 sanctions may help clients avoid this problem.
121. William J. Wernz, Professional Responsibility Board-Proposed Procedural Changes,
47 BmEcn & B. MwN., Nov. 1990, at 15, 18-19 (discussing new Rule 26A). The impetus for this
amendment seems to come from lawyer abuses in which suspended attorneys would notify their
clients in a manner suggesting that the attorney was merely going on a vacation or leave of ab-
sence rather than being disciplined for a breach of professional responsibility standards. Id.
122. See id. Prior to this new mandate, candid communications to clients about attorney disci-
pline were apparently seen as undesirable to the disciplined lawyer, while "taking a vacation"
seemed to cover the situation adequately. A policy of mandated disclosure could help move the
focus away from actively seeking to camouflage the fact of violation toward seeking to avoid such
violations in the first instance.
123. See infra notes 163-168, 176-82 and accompanying text (discussing advertising methods
covered by disclosure requirements).
124. W.LGING, supra note 96, at 5. Moreover, if a formal disciplinary action were held, there
may be some dissemination to peers, clients, the legal media, and others under present practices.
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federal system of sanctions recognizes that rule-violating conduct has many
nonmonetary risks as well as monetary impact."z A client-consumer vi-
tally needs to be aware that nonmonetary sanctions, which are also possible
under Rule 11, can be extraordinarily damaging to the client's interests.
For example:
* the federal court's dismissal of the client's cause of action pursuant
to Rule 11 would have significant implications for the business or
personal life of the client, irrespective of the lack of any monetary
sanctions;
126
* the client's business or personal objectives could be affected ad-
versely by such things as threatened Rule 11 orders precluding the
introduction of evidence, preventing the litigation of certain claims
or defenses, or prohibiting future litigation;1
27
" the entry of a default judgment could arise under Rule 11;128 or
" other nonmonetary sanctions may be tailored in a Rule 11 situation
to the circumstances of the case.'
29
If the attorney-client relationship is predicated upon mutual trust and
confidence, this predicate will not go unscathed when nonmonetary sanc-
tions are imposed pursuant to Rule 11.130
With such consequences in mind, ponder for a moment the lawyer se-
lection process of the sophisticated client-consumer of legal services, or that
of a referring attorney. When a sophisticated person makes a determination
about the selection, retention, or referral of counsel, the following concerns
would be present when a history of disciplinary sanctions 13 1 is made func-
tionally visible:
(a) Whether effects of past sanctions will be felt in a current case,
especially if it is to be tried before the same judge who had imposed sanc-
tions upon the violating lawyer in a previous case.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 49, at 127; see also ABA Standards and Guidelines, supra note 106, at
127-28 (outlining procedural considerations for the imposition of sanctions).
125. See Lupo v. Rowland & Co., 857 F.2d 482, 485 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1081 (1989); United States v. Allen L. Wright Dev. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (N.D. IlL
1987); WILLGING, supra note 96, at 31.
126. See Haugen v. Sutherlin, 804 F.2d 490, 491 (8th Cir. 1986).
127. See Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 26-28.
128. See Haugen, 804 F.2d at 491. But see Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 27.
129. See Phelps, supra note 106, at 348-49; Schwarzer, supra note 106, at 1020; FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 42.24, 42.3 (2d ed. 1985). Entry of
default judgment of Rule 11 has replaced a pre-1983 amended remedy of mere dismissal. But see
Fraser & Miller, supra note 99, at 27 (outlining proposed amendments to Rule 11).
130. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text
131. Courts can review the attorney's past conduct to determine appropriate sanctions. In re
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Kunstler v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607
(1991); see supra note 117 and accompanying text
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(b) Whether the effect of past sanctions, even before a different trial
judge but in the same district, raises similar concerns.
(c) Whether the sanctioned attorney-once burned, twice cautious-
will tend to throttle back too greatly his zeal in the new case on behalf of
the new client because of past Rule 11 sanctions.'32
(d) Whether the sanctions signal that the sanctioned attorney is so
inherently competitive, i.e., an incurable "Rambo," that he may also con-
duct the new case with excessive zeal.
(e) Whether Rule 11 sanctions imposed during the new litigation
would impact on trial or settlement negotiations.
(f) In the event that monetary as well as nonmonetary sanctions have
been imposed upon the attorney, whether the business reality of this finan-
cial loss will affect the attorney's judgment and conduct in the present
matter.
Such information could decisively affect the client's selection of an
attorney or a referring counsel's choice of attorney. Viewed in this light,
disclosure advertising of such sanctions could potentially pose a significant
threat to some of the future business sought by the sanctioned attorney.
Thus, visibility in the marketplace should enhance sanction avoidance and
act as a deterrent against inappropriate lawyer conduct.' 33
C. Better-Functioning Courts
The entire panoply of social interests underlying Rule 11 (and its state
counterparts) weighs in favor of the visibility proposal. In addition to the
client-consumer, the judicial system as a whole would benefit from disclo-
sure advertising. In an institutional sense, the threat to the administration of
justice and to the court system itself lies at the heart of the efforts since
1983 to impose order upon the growing "Rambo" approach to use of the
132. The very purpose of deterrence is to stem the tide of wildcat litigation tactics. There
may, in many instances, exist a fine line between excessive zeal and sufficient, but inexcessive,
zeal. Just exactly how "gun shy" a sanctioned attorney may become is a matter of serious
speculation.
133. Certainly some negative effects may arise in the small class of cases where the client is
so intent upon achieving a "Raibo"-like result that the client specifically seeks out a lawyer with
a trail of sanctions. See Knox, supra note 33, at 1. In this same light, there may be some wildcat-
ters who wear their sanctions as a badge of honor and direct their services toward such clients.
Ironically, in terms of economic efficiency, such lawyers and clients could both be well-served by
discipline visibility, which would clearly identify those who have had Rule 11 sanctions fre-
quently imposed to any prospective client who might view that as desirable in a litigator. We
submit, however, that the universe of potential litigation clients overwhelmingly consists of those
who do not want to take the risks involved in a potential court-sanction snarl. Potential clients and
referring attorneys generally should view themselves as especially well-served by receiving infor-
mation through disclosure advertising, which allows them to make an informed choice during the
lawyer selection process.
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judicial system.' The broad social interest in stemming this tide of behav-
ior, the courts' significant distaste for monetary sanctions, and the accom-
panying search for effective nonmonetary systems of deterrence, support a
policy of disciplinary visibility.
V. INFORmATION AsyMwmTRY AND DIsLOCATIoNs IN THE
MARKETPLACE
If you really believe in a competitive open-market economy, if you
believe in the worth of your own product or service, then be hon-
est. Drop the old working plan of first getting on, then getting
honest, and finally hoping to get honor. Reverse the order....
Ivan Hill 35
Law is devolving from a profession to a business, or even a commod-
ity, in the marketplace, and many of the perceived present difficulties with
the legal profession arise from this change. 36 If the offering of legal serv-
ices is becoming increasingly more of a commodity in this post-Bates era,
then the need for disclosure advertising is considerably heightened. The
marketplace factors, especially the wider asymmetry of information be-
tween lawyers and consumer-clients, become increasingly salient when one
views law as no longer deeply rooted in its professional base. This Article
does not suggest that disclosure advertising will reverse this trend line from
professionalism to commodity; however, it does suggest that disclosure ad-
vertising would help redress certain dislocations caused by the metamor-
phosis in the practice of law.
This transition from a profession has created something of a "Reichian
dislocation." Professor Charles A. Reich has observed that when new con-
stitutional principles are created and take hold in our society, something of
a rule of unintended consequences may appear.137 The former rights, pro-
134. See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
135. Ivan Hill, The Meaning of Ethics and Freedom, in THE ETHMcAL BASIS OF ECONOMIC
FREEDOM 19 (Ivan Hill ed., 1990).
136. See ABEL, supra note 79, at 163-65, 184-88; ABA CoaMMIsSIoN ON ADVERTISINo, Rn.
PORT ON THE SURVEY ON THE IMAGE OF LAWYERS AND ADVERTISING 41-42 (1990). "The Com-
mission is convinced that secrecy and discipline proceedings continue to be the greatest single
source of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary systems. Because it engenders such distrust, se-
crecy does great harm to the reputation of the profession." McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 33
(emphasis added). However, the business part of law has always been present to a degree. Even
so great a jurist-lawyer as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., acknowledged the need for "'the greedy
watch for clients and the practice of shopkeepers' arts"' as part of daily lawyering. Thomas A.
Balmer, Holmes on Law as a Business and a Profession, 42 J.L. ED. 591-92 (1992).
137. Writing in a different context, Professor Reich has observed how the American constitu-
tional order can have a growing dysfunctional impact upon individual citizens. This can come
about when new constitutional or other legal principles are created and eventually take hold in the
system. Such legal principles may dilute or skew the previously established individual rights and
expectations of citizens and thus give rise to the functional impairment of what were formerly the
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tections, and legal structures that safeguarded the individual citizen and her
needs within the previous legal framework of society may be dislocated or
impaired; but no new structures or replacement protections are invented, or
their need even foreseen. 3' Such a dislocation, to the disadvantage of the
client-consumer, may have been at work in the marketplace for legal serv-
ices since Bates.
139
In the past, clients learned of the skills and flaws of their potential
counsel through discussions with friends, relatives, co-workers, neighbors,
or members of their church, club, or lodge.' 40 With increasing urbanization
and the advent of lawyer advertising, the old marketplace equation, imper-
fect as it may have been, is no longer available to the client-consumer of
legal services. Although lawyer discipline existed in this earlier, quieter
era, the dimensions of the problem of wildcat litigators, client trust fund
abusers, and sexual harassers were not perceived by the consuming public
to be as rampant or as destructive.
14 1
In many respects, the practice of law in this new marketplace is still
treated as a profession. Disciplinary information is largely not available in
a form useful to the client-consumer. 42 This is advantageous to lawyers as
vendors of services. Simultaneously, the practice of law is treated as a busi-
ness empowered to use very sophisticated marketing techniques, again
favoring only lawyer-vendors. 43 Meanwhile, the client-consumer has not
been granted a concomitant benefit, and hence the dislocation in the former
marketplace equation.
That attorneys in the post-Bates era have advertised and marketed their
services with ever increasing ingenuity, some might say ferocity, is itself
protections and legal structures safeguarding individuals and the individuals' needs within the
framework of society. This comes about without the provision for any new structures or replace-
ment protections. The cumulative impact upon the individual may not be intended, nor even
envisioned, when the new constitutional principles are being created, but such unintended conse-
quences of significance can accrue. Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YAm LJ. 1409,
1412-15 (1991).
138. Id. Consider the marketplace for a new car buyer who is choosing, for example, between
a Toyota Carny, Dodge Intrepid, and Ford Taurus. The competing dealership sales brochures list
scores of features-whole charts full of details about each vehicle. The consumer can also read
reams of comparative data in Consumer Reports or Motor Trend. The consumer can test drive
each vehicle and dicker over the pricing. Who would argue that open access to all this visible
information is not positive for the consumer, the marketplace and, in the long run, the auto manu-
facturers and the overall economy? Carefully selecting not merely your auto, but your lawyer, is
at least equally important.
139. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
140. See ABEL, supra note 79, at 119-20.
141. As the McKay Commission has pointed out, there is a need to remove the public percep-
tion that secrecy in disciplinary proceedings is a source of distrust and harm to the profession.
McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 133.
142. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
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some evidence of the impact of the marketplace upon law firms. 144 Some
commentators submit that those who value advertising as a part of the oper-
ation of their legal services business, and the benefits that promotional visi-
bility brings, are the very attorneys who would view the need to disclose
factual information about disciplinary actions against them in their own ad-
vertising as inimical to their business interests. 14' That some serious con-
duct modification would naturally flow from this is a self-evident
presumption. The long history of invisible discipline suggests that attor-
neys, as business-generating professionals, resist the publication of negative
information. 146 Thus, the historic invisibility of discipline answers much of
the question as to whether disclosure advertising would have a deterrent
effect.
147
Given the marketplace experiences of businesses outside the practice
of law such as the Tylenol scare, airline crashes, or the defective General
Motors pick-up trucks, there is little doubt that the general business com-
munity regards negative information as inimical to economic success and
expends considerable effort implementing marketing plans to overcome
such negatives, either to correct or to rebut them.' 48 Accordingly, it ap-
144. Edward Poll, Make Money Through Marketing, in COMPLEAT LAw., Spring 1991, at 38.
Notably, a study by the National Association of Law Firm Marketing (NALFMA) indicated that
professional marketing services to law firms can generate salaries of up to $219,000 annually.
Carolyn S. Paschal, America's Leading Law Firms Talk Candidly About Marketing, 54 TEx. B.J.
129, 129 (1991). High echelon strategic planners with an MBA generally earn between $70,000
and $150,000. Mid-level marketing specialists earn between $40,000 and $60,000. There is a
very active market for these professionals, complete with placement networks and trade associa-
tions. Id. But see Mark Hansen, Brochures, Newsletters Ineffective, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 30.
145. Given the popularity of articles in various bar journals concerning marketing tools and
strategies, together with the mall order market for such materials, most of the practicing bar is
now very sensitive to the marketing factors and the image sought to be projected. See
Hibschweiler et al., supra note 30, at 120. Among the most notable of the mailed solicitations are
those of the Institute of Professional Training, Inc. of Pensacola, Florida, which will supply any
law firm with a three-hour video program for $169 plus shipping and handling, together with
50-page workbooks, all devoted toward "How to Market Your Law Firm"; the materials include
specialized sections on how to get new clients, build referral networks, get more business out of
existing clients, survey clients, market activities, use newsletters, brochures, and other public rela-
tions tools, use alternative billing techniques as a marketing tool, etc. The advertising blurbs for
the video set contain anonymous testimonials from eight attorneys that border on the Siskel &
Ebert reviews of hit movies. See McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
146. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-79 (1977); ABEL, supra note 79, at
144-45; McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
147. In the area of court sanctions, at least one commentator has suggested that visibility has a
deterrent effect. Wn.GiNG, supra note 96, at 30.
148. See Gary R. Garner, Toward a Positive Image: Changing the Negative Image, BuHAnu-
CRAT: J. FOR PUB. MrRS., Spring 1991, at 35; Robert Howard, Crisis Control Becomes a Growth
Industry as Companies Struggle to Regain Positive Image, L.A. Bus. J., Nov. 9, 1987, § 1 at 9.
During the early days of the 1987 odometer scandal involving Chrysler products, the major news
was the strategy of making a straightforward admission and apology by company president Lee
lococca in an effort to restore customer confidence. See, e.g., The News Is That Iacocca's Re-
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pears something of a marketplace axiom that negative information will have
a decided impact upon success.
149
Since Bates, no significant marketplace realignments have been devel-
oped to offer client-consumers advantages complementing those gained by
lawyers during this period. In sum, disclosure advertising would help to
bring about that balance of rights and protections that each client-consumer
requires in order to make a more economically efficient choice in the
marketplace. 150
VI. QuALrrY, IhVISIBILrrY, AND THE MARKETPLACE
[A]nd if we think [the people] not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education.
Thomas Jefferson
15
The new era in lawyer advertising is necessarily related to economic
theories involving market efficiency. Under classic economic theory, pur-
chasers of goods or services acting in a free market, making millions of
individual purchasing decisions, will determine the price and quantity of
goods and services.152 Classic market theory holds that the person or firm
offering goods or services will revise its behavior in response to the signals
sponse Made News, Cm. TRm., July 27, 1987, at 6; James Risen, Iacocca Admits Mileage Tam-
pering Was 'Dumb', L.A. TIms, July 2, 1987, § 4, at 1.
"Crisis communication" has developed into a business specialty in recent years, and at least
one university, the University of Southern California, has established a specialty for its MBA
program. See Howard, supra, § 1, at 9. The bar's crisis of confidence identified by Professor
Powell and others is not a single, sudden marketplace disaster. The bar may profit, however, from
the twin strategies of damage control and regaining public trust that have been developed by the
advertising and public relations industry. One essential is for "the corporation to convince the
public it is putting the general welfare ahead of its own bottom line." Bob Papoe, Merrell Dow
was Quick Study in Dealing With Seldane Scare, Tim GAzETE (Montreal), Sept. 3, 1992, at C2.
Public relations people deem it necessary to "demonstrate that their first responsibility is to their
customers." Id.
149. According to the head of one crisis management group from the business sector, all
marketplace crises pass through eight stages. The fourth of these, which needs to be contemplated
by the bar, is "loss of control." See Howard, supra note 148, § 1, at 9.
150. It is not suggested, however, that the current theories of economic market efficiency (or
economic capital market efficiency-ECMH), so heavily researched in securities law and ac-
counting, are at work in this area. The uninformed, barely controlled chaos of the marketplace
where extensive lawyer advertising exists is not a highly efficient exchange with sophisticated
transaction agents and ongoing discourses of financial and other data. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 549-53 (1984);
Arthur R. Wyatt, Efficient Market Theory: Its Impact on Accounting, J. Acct., Feb. 1983, at 56.
151. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in BARTLETr's
FALIAR QUOTATIONS 389 (15th ed. 1980).
152. WAYNE C. CURIS, MICROECONOMIC CONCEPTS FOR ATo'mYs 9-16 (1984); PAUL
SAMUELSON, ECONOmiCs 57-61 (11th ed. 1980); Sumner H. Slichter, Free Private Enterprise, in
READINGS IN ECONOMICS 14 (7th ed. 1973).
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sent from consumers about the value of its goods and services in the mar-
ketplace.15 3 This presupposes an efficient marketplace, which in turn pre-
supposes that consumers have access to the necessary forms of information
concerning the products that are offered to them.1 54 In order to survive, a
vendor of goods or services in an efficient marketplace must modify and
adapt its behavior in areas such as pricing and quality of goods and services
offered. The likely alternative to such adaptive market behavior is to be
driven out by competitors. 155
Even the most laissez-faire free market economists concede that mo-
nopolies are the greatest danger to consumers in the marketplace.1 56  Of
necessity, the practicing bar holds a regulated monopoly on access to jus-
tice.15 7 Although this monopoly characteristic should be offset by a seem-
ingly unlimited supply of new lawyers entering the market, it is not. The
influx of additional vendors does not remove the problem of asymmetric
information 5 ' caused by lawyer advertising in a regulated monopoly cou-
pled with disciplinary invisibility. Generally, the consumer's best protec-
tion against poor quality or overpricing is free competition. The benefits of
free competition hinge upon the access to information about both price and
quality.159 Information in typical retail situations is supplied through com-
petitive advertising and pricing among rival vendors of similar goods, plus
153. d; see also GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS 173-74 (1988).
154. Disclosure advertising is purposed upon overturning the ancient philosopher's saying that
"[tihe market is a place set apart where men may deceive one another." Id. at 172 (quoting
Anacharsis of Scythia (c. 600 B.C.)). It is axiomatic that a consumer informed of negative infor-
mation may not hire that disciplined lawyer. That is the marketplace power of information.
"Calling attention to danger may reduce demand for that class of products in general." A. ALUEN
ScnuD, PROPFERY, PowER, AND Puuc CHoIcE: AN INQuiRY INro LAW AND ECONOMICS 106
(2d ed. 1987).
155. HODOSON, supra note 153, at 174-75; Slichter, supra note 152, at 14. But see SALIUEI
SON, supra note 152, at 62. A pareto optimum can be reached, at least theoretically, through
consumer sovereignty not distorted by advertising (i.e., incomplete or demand-creating informa-
tion); ROBERT L. HnimRONEP & LESTER C. ThuRow, ECONOMICS EXPI.AINED 179-81 (1982).
156. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE, A PERSONAL STATEMmr 226
(1980). The close cousin of monopolies, oligopolies or industry-wide deception, may also cause
information suppression to distort the market adversely to the consumer. ScHrem, supra note 154,
at 107; SAMJmELsoN, supra note 152, at 475-78.
157. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
158. The core of the problem is not based on the number of lawyers in the marketplace, but
upon the consumer's exposure to advertising without other significant sources of information from
which to choose. Asymmetric information is the enemy of perfect competition. The marketplace
in which client-consumers must function is one that lacks information or the information is too
complex or cumbersome to ingest rationally. Neoclassical economists and their critics both agree
that consumers' inability to maximize marketplace decisions arises from both lack of information
and an inability to process complex information. See HODGSON, supra note 153, at 79-82; THE
MIT DicnONARY OF MODERN ECONOMCS 78 (4th ed. 1992).
159. Scream, supra note 154, at 106; L.G. Tesler, Some Aspects of the Economics of Advertis-
ing, in READINGS IN ECONOmcs 163, 166-68 (7th ed. 1973).
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information from various third-party sources such as Consumer Reports or
the Better Business Bureau. 160 When necessary information is not avail-
able, the market will not function as efficiently to the benefit of
consumers.16
In selecting a lawyer, the only data concerning quality that is function-
ally available to most prospective client-consumers comes from the
self-serving advertising of lawyer-vendors and from the general practice of
lawyer licensing by the courts.' 62 This data is hardly informative on issues
of quality. Sometimes the information about quality, which is vital to make
the market function efficiently, is held by government agencies. 63 When
this circumstance arises, as it does in the case of lawyer disciplinary ac-
tions, there are two possible governmental responses. One response is to
retain the information and proceed with a network of bureaucratic regula-
tion and policing of the marketplace, using the pertinent information to re-
strict, change, or weed out the inefficient or poor-quality providers.' 64 The
other approach, and the one advocated by those with greatest regard for the
freedom of the marketplace, is that the government should make such infor-
mation available to the consuming public so that the public will have full
knowledge of the merits and demerits of the competing products.
65
To a limited extent, the American model in the marketplace for legal
services has adopted some aspects of both approaches. Since the Bates case
in 1977, the competing suppliers of lawyer services may advertise in the
marketplace as an element of free commercial speech.' 66 Meanwhile, the
bar disciplinary process is more public in certain respects. For example, in
many jurisdictions, lay members of the consuming public are members of
some of the disciplinary or grievance committees that police the practice of
law.167 In some jurisdictions, the statistical data regarding lawyer sanctions
160. Tesler, supra note 159, at 166-68; FPmDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 156, at 224.
161. Tesler, supra note 159, at 165-68. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMIlH) predicates
that all relevant information will be available to the market and will be digested as part of the
market process. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Infor-
mation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Ra,. 761, 786 (1985); HEILBRONER & TUmow,
supra note 155, at 168.
162. See supra notes 35, 59 and accompanying text.
163. FRiDmALN & FRiEDMAN, supra note 156, at 227; see also HODGSON, supra note 153, at
183-84.
164. FRIEDMAN & FRiEDMAN, supra note 156, at 227; see also ABE., supra note 79, at 151-54;
SAMUELSON, supra note 152, at 141-49.
165. FRiEDMAN & FRiEDMAN, supra note 156, at 227. In the authors' view, Nobel Laureate
Milton Friedman is the economist most strongly identified with free market principles in modem
times. See HODOSON, supra note 153, at 131-32.
166. See supra note 27.
167. Virginia Bowers, A Lay Person Looks at Lawyer Discipline, 56 TaX. B.J. 75 (1993)
excerpted from Virginia Bowers, A Speech to the Farm, Ranch, and Agri-Business Bankruptcy
Institute (Oct. 9, 1992). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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is published anonymously, and, as noted above, names and details may
sometimes be published. In nearly all circumstances, however, publication
takes place in specialized bar journals or case reports instead of in a system-
atic fashion generally accessible to the consuming public. 16 8 Protection is
almost exclusively in the realm of sanctions imposed by courts and discipli-
nary committees, which are neither functionally visible nor disciplined by
marketplace economic principles. 69
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
Breathes there a lawyer with soul so dead That never to himself
hath said This is mine own, my letterhead.
Anonymous Attorney
If increased visibility of lawyer discipline is to promote an efficient
marketplace, requirements for disclosure advertising must be systematic
and uniform. 170 If the imposition of such disclosure advertising is left
solely to the ad hoc discretion of the disciplinary body, whether a court or
an ethics panel acting pursuant to a court directive, the marketplace effects
will continue to be skewed. 17' For instance, if only some attorneys who
violate the use of client trust funds are required to make disclosure, and
others are not, the maximum marketplace benefits will not occur, and the
efficiency of the marketplace will not be optimized.172 Moreover, without
the certainty of such a sanction, if it is imposed purely on an ad hoc discre-
tionary fashion, some risk-takers would not be deterred.' 7 Certainty and
uniformity of the imposition of the burden of disclosure advertising are
probably the best assurances of both deterrence and marketplace efficiency.
A. Devising a System
Any disclosure plan needs to be systematic and include even-handed
rules for the application of visibility requirements. 74 For purposes of ad-
168. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 22, 156-61 and accompanying text.
170. It is informative to read the comments of federal district judges concerned with the appli-
cation of Rule 11 sanctions. One recurring theme is that the appellate-approved standards for
application of Rule 11 are not sufficiently clear so that sanctions may be applied with some level
of predictability of outcome. Wiggins & Willging, supra note 91, at Comments to questions 13
and to p. 8 found in the Comments section, pp. 1-22 and 1-55, respectively. One of the axioms of
free marketplace competition is a level field of information. See Gordon & Komhauser, supra
note 161, at 168.
171. Asymmetrical information can be achieved in various ways. See supra note 158.
172. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
173. Part of the justification of the instant proposal is deterrence of potential wrongdoers;
another is the deterrence of repeated wrongdoing by previously sanctioned lawyers.
174. The ongoing struggle within the disciplinary bodies of the bar regarding the question of
visibility gives some sense of the extreme level of suspicion that the practicing bar has to the
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vancing discussion, an illustrative grid is attached as Exhibit A at the end of
this Article. This grid suggests a pattern that would require maximum
scope and minimal duration for first-time sanctions and would tend not to
place much confidence in any mandatory disclosure that affected only dis-
cretionary communications of the sanctioned attorney.
This Article does not purport, however, to formulate a set of "sentenc-
ing guidelines" that would apply whenever a lawyer has been sanctioned or
disciplined. 75 Rather, this section will describe a number of elements that
should be considered when devising a mandate of disclosure advertising.
Exhibit A is intended to reflect these elements in an ordered manner.
1. Scope of Disclosure Advertising
Only a saint or incompetent would voluntarily finance the disclosure
of his own misdeeds. Hence, a sanctioned attorney could be expected to
dodge a visibility mandate by discontinuing that portion of his advertising
budget that is purely discretionary. Accordingly, visibility mandates that
affect only the broad range of discretionary advertising, such as magazine
ads, brochures, TV spots, or coffee mugs, would have little impact. Most
sanctioned attorneys, however, would be extremely sensitive to those dis-
closure requirements that affected their letterheads, business cards, and
other everyday, near-nondiscretionary communications to clients, peers,
and potential clients.' 7 6 Thus, when the offense or the repeated offenses are
of a serious magnitude, the scope of the disclosure mandate must reach both
discretionary and near-nondiscretionary communications.
Near-nondiscretionary communications would include:
* letterheads; 17 7
notion of public access to disciplinary information. Given this historic level of hostility, it would
be a disservice to the client-consumers, the public, and the attorneys involved if visibility require-
ments were not uniformly applied. See McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
175. Exhibit A, attached at the end of this Article, is not intended as a finished and complete
proposal for a grid of guidelines with respect to the visibility requirement,,, but is attached solely
for purposes of discussion and focus on the nature of the considerations that would need to be
balanced in defining the visibility standards of any jurisdiction.
176. Any attorney who has been through the selection process for a firm's new letterhead style
or the selection of uniform business cards understands how heightened the concerns of even the
most senior, responsible practitioners can become at times.
177. One commentator has noted that "[m]eticulous rules governing the contents of letter-
heads have been traditional.... [But] most lawyers will probably continue to comply without
challenging the regulations, however, because letterheads are hardly a very effective form of ad-
vertising." WOLFRAM, supra note 49, at 785 (emphasis added). Letterheads do, notwithstanding
this history, constitute an especially unusual problem for the transactional or business attorney.
Extraordinary efforts continue at every business-oriented firm throughout the bar to devise, per-
fect, and define the contents and scope of the formal law firm legal opinion letter. This missive,
fostering reliance and attendant exposures to liability, is customarily reported on the letterhead of
the law firm rendering such opinion. In the transactional practice of law, it is hard to envision any
1994]
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• business cards; 178
" office signage;
17 9
* telephone listings; 8 '
* Martindale-Hubbell listings;18 and
" local or state bar journal listings.182
Discretionary communications would include:
* advertising in the yellow pages;
* newspaper and magazine advertising;
* broadcast television, radio, and cable advertising;
* mailings of letters, brochures, newsletters, client advisories and the
like;
o sponsorship of cultural, social, or educational matters; and
o coffee mugs, T-shirts, pen sets, and other bric-a-brac.
A comprehensive system of lawyer disclosure would encompass both
discretionary and nondiscretionary communications, include enough infor-
mation to put the client-consumer on notice, be imposed for a duration com-
matter of significance going forward without much rendering of legal opinions from among the
various participating law firms. Contemplating what might be the effect of a disclosure advertis-
ing statement on the firm letterhead that some or all of the members of the firm have been subject
to serious disciplinary actions or court sanctions in recent times could greatly color the general
desirability and marketplace value of the firm's opinion letters. See, e.g., AmniucAN COLLEGE o
REAL E TATE LAWYERS, THE ATroRNEY's OPMNON LmrEra IN REAL ESTATE TRANsAcnONS
(1992); ABA Committee on Legal Opinions, Third Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the
Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAw.,
Nov. 1991, at 167.
178. See WoLFRAM, supra note 49, at 776.
179. Since Model Rule 7.2(a) seems to authorize outdoor billboard advertising, the scope of
office signage has expanded from the painted announcement on an office door or window-the
traditional "shingle" that a lawyer would hang out by the office-to the potential for a neonized
and pyloned billboard. See WOLFRAM, supra note 49, at 785.
180. In central Missouri, the yellow pages of the telephone include half-page, three-color an-
nouncements by local attorneys publicizing their forms and practices. See Knox, supra note 33.
181. Because MARDnMAE-HUrBE.L is the most uniformly available method of referral used
by attorneys in one city or area to find representation for a client in another jurisdiction, there
would be vast utility in having disciplinary sanctions noted in such listings. Quite apart from any
questions, specious or otherwise, regarding "negligence in making a referral," the referring coun-
sel presumably has an interest in furthering client good will by seeing that the client is referred to
an appropriate counsel. See WoLFRAM, supra note 49, at 775.
182. Id. Some jurisdictions publish an annual edition of their bar association membership,
listing various bar members, their addresses, and telephone or fax numbers. See, e.g., Alphabeti-
cal Listings, 50 BENCH & B. MiN., Jan. 1993, at A-1, A-1 to A-125. In addition, many special-
ized associations also publish listings of their membership nationally for the convenience of other
members and, in some instances, for purposes of client referral work. For example, the 1992
American College of Real Estate Lawyers Handbook & Directory publishes photographs, ad-
dresses, educational backgrounds, bar memberships, ages, home addresses, and similar informa-
tion with respect to each of its members.
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mensurate with the offense, and reflect the seriousness of the offense
through both scope and duration.
2. Information to be Disclosed
One of the most extensive bar journal disclosure sections can be found
in the Wisconsin Lawyer.'8 3 The name of the offending attorney, together
with a detailed synopsis of the disciplinary case, sometimes running many
paragraphs, is reported. This Wisconsin approach to mandatory publication
parallels that of the California Lawyer,'84 which sets forth the name and
details of the offense, together with a legend explaining in very general
terms the nature of various offenses and sanctions. As a variation, Minne-
sota recently adopted a rule that requires the suspended attorney to commu-
nicate this fact to his existing clients and to provide the clients with a copy
of the actual order or other disciplinary directive.1
8 1
In addition to visible and indexed publication of the official reports by
a court or disciplinary agency, attorney advertising should include a brief
statement naming the attorney who has been disciplined and the nature of
the discipline. The attorney should also be required to furnish a copy of the
disciplinary order to all existing and potential clients or at least the tele-
phone number or address of the appropriate disciplinary body or court.'
l 6
A second level of concern is the length of disclosure, particularly on
letterheads, business cards, and other limited space, near non-discretionary
communications. The disclosure needs to be sufficient to give notice and
also information on where to make further inquiries. Some standard lan-
guage can be crafted readily.
3. Duration of Mandatory Disclosure
America has built much of its success, both as a society and in the
marketplace, on notions of the "second chance."' 87 Consequently, only
rarely should an attorney who has been disciplined or sanctioned, but not
permanently disbarred, be required to disclose the disciplinary matter in
perpetuity.1
88
183. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
186. For example, the California Lawyer lists addresses and telephone numbers in the key that
accompanies monthly discipline reports. See supra note 10.
187. For example, the Bankruptcy Code is designed to discharge debtors of most of their
pre-bankruptcy debts, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and afford them a fresh start in the mar-
ketplace. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
188. It is hoped that a disciplinary body would not see fit to substitute permanent disclosure
advertising of very significant breaches of professional standards (e.g., misappropriation of client
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On the other hand, the great American sports pastime has a notion of
"three strikes and you're out," and this idea of a repeated pattern of wrong-
doing is echoed in cultural and legal institutions."8 9 Permanently requiring
disclosure would seem worthwhile regarding recidivist offenders, such as
the sexually harassing Wisconsin attorney' 90 or the Texas attorney who
continued to practice after suspension of his license.'x9 In addition, lawyers
who repeat offenses of a more minor nature, such as procrastination in han-
dling client matters, would also be subject to significant disclosure
mandates.192
Certainly, mandatory disclosure must extend for a period long enough
to exert a significant deterrent effect.' 9 3 Moreover, imposition of a lengthy
or permanent period of mandatory disclosure only upon the offending attor-
ney's discretionary communications would be meaningless, as the attorney
would simply cease to use the regulated forms of discretionary communica-
tion, yet still continue to conduct business in a relatively normal fashion. In
many circumstances, deterrence would probably be most effective if the
duration was short-for example, one to three years-but the scope in-
cluded both discretionary and near-nondiscretionary communications.
4. Nature of the Offense
Certain types of offenses are of seismically serious proportions be-
cause of their destructive potential for the clients involved or for the credi-
bility of the legal system itself.194 In this category fall fraud on the court,
obstruction of justice, misappropriation of client trust funds or other client
property, significant conflicts of interest, sexual exploitation of clients, or
unauthorized and harmful betrayal of client confidences. Serious discipli-
monies) in lieu of a permanent or long-term revocation of the offending counsel's license to
practice law.
189. As noted in the text, the setting of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 violations reflects the
history of prior sanctions. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 4.
191. Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991).
192. Ponder for a moment how many female clients might have avoided the problems in-
volved in dealing with attorney Heilprin during the years between 1973 and 1992 had they been
aware of his various disciplinary problems involving sexual harassment of female clients. See
supra note 4.
193. There are ranges of time that would seem to be minimal (such as one to three years) and
ranges of time short of perpetual which would be regarded as maximums (such as ten years). See
Exhibit A.
194. Certainly, some reprimands for minor delays in completing client business would not
pose a threat to the system of justice itself, whereas more significant problems might. Moreover,
the failure to remove public suspicion of the process of discipline could result, as Professor Mc-
Kay noted in 1990, in the public's imposing its desires upon the process of lawyer regulation.
McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at iii.
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nary matters would call for disclosure on all communications and would
include a complete description of the nature of the offense for the longest
period possible.' 95
A certain type of repeat offender requires added consideration. An
offender who does the same thing in a repeated fashion, such as the Wis-
consin attorney with the repeated sexual harassment record, would likely
deserve a permanent visibility mandate on all communications. Similarly,
consider an attorney who has been disciplined for one type of matter in the
past (e.g., dilatory representation of a client in court) and is now being dis-
ciplined for some different misconduct (e.g., wrongful communication with
a lay person represented by counsel). Such a repeat offender would deserve
some level of mandatory disclosure as well. Both could be dealt with in
accordance with the principles noted above.
Now consider the special type of repeat violator who has taken on the
guise of "Artful Dodger" (an attorney who violated client trust accounts in
the past and has now found a new, technically different fashion to appropri-
ate other client property). Artful Dodger has demonstrated a cunning disre-
gard for the codes and disciplinary rules. Such a repeat offender may be
irredeemable and would fall into the category of those who deserve a per-
petual mandate of disclosure on all discretionary and near-nondiscretionary
communications.
B. Special Considerations: Near-Nondiscretionary Communications
Although mandated disclosure on correspondence should be particu-
larly effective, such a mandate presents an interesting problem if the attor-
ney is not a sole practitioner. 196 When one or a few attorneys from a fimn
have been disciplined, should a disclosure be required on the firm letterhead
if that letterhead lists all of the attorneys in the firm, including those who
195. One commentator has recently observed that it is necessary to "assess both actual and
potential future injury to clients when assessing whether a lawyer's sanction properly protects the
public." Janine C. Ogando, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public Protection, 5 Gao.
J. LEGAL Err-cs 459, 463 (1991). For example, lawyers who control client trust funds, but who
have sanctions arising out of misuse or misappropriation of such funds, would constitute the type
of discipline that needs a relatively full-blown disclosure in the lawyer's various forms of adver-
tising. Il
196. The large firm-indeed, the multi-national law firm-has significant problems with its
letterhead. Already, certain disclosures are required of those firm lawyers who are not licensed to
practice in a jurisdiction where the firm has an office. Moreover, space limitations and print size
(probably combined with some ego needs) have moved many large firms away from the
all-encompassing letterhead and into a more personalized form of stationery that designates only
the name of the firm and also the identity of the particular lawyer who is sending the letter. In this
latter instance, it would seem very easy to target the information regarding disciplinary matters on
the particular attorney who is using this method of communication. See WoLFRAM, supra note 49,
at 785.
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were disciplined? Using asterisks and footnotes to indicate those attorneys
who have been disciplined, just as bar admissions are now indicated, is one
possibility. 9 7 Another option is requiring disclosure only on those firm
letterheads that are actually used by the offending attorney in any of his
communications. The trend in many firms is to eliminate the all-inclusive
letterheads and move toward an individualized firm letterhead for each at-
torney. In such case, the disclosure can be pinpointed rather easily with a
requirement that all letters issued by the disciplined attorney must carry the
disclosure.
Business cards also seem readily amenable to disclosure information,
since in most instances the business cards are personalized to the partner or
associate in the firm who is carrying and distributing the card. Thus, a rule
could require that all business cards used by the disciplined attorney carry
the disclosure information on the back-or even on an allonge' 98 if neces-
sary for space reasons. The extent of the disclosure, as with letterheads,
could be tailored to the circumstances.
Office signage presents one of the most complex issues among the
near non-discretionary communications. The dispositions could range from
outright removal of all signage during suspension or disbarment, to a posted
general warning coupled with notices of whom to contact for further data,
to taking no action. The severity of the penalty would be a function of the
severity of the attorney misconduct.
Martindale-Hubbell and similar attorney listings, congested as they
sometimes are, could develop a new code-key for various classifications of
disciplinary matters or carry brief statements regarding the nature and dura-
tion of the sanctions. Because courts and disciplinary bodies may vary
widely in their disclosure requirements, Martindale-Hubbell and other such
listings might approach the matter by offering a choice between a standard-
ized code-key for sanctions or a statement indicating where information can
be obtained. Dropping the sanctioned lawyer or firm altogether, though
possible, does not seem desirable.
C. Special Considerations: Discretionary Communications
Print and broadcast advertising, direct mail campaigns, and event
sponsorships are readily amenable to disclosure rules. Most such promo-
197. Attached as Exhibit B is a redacted form of an actual letterhead. This was a letter of
notification of availability to render legal services sent to many citizens in the Houston, Texas
area. Please note the extensive use of small, bold type for the several lines of footnotes discussing
the attributes of the firm's two lawyers. It is submitted that since the use of such footnote material
is available for purposes of promotional language, it could be readily adapted to contain a required
statement pertaining to any disciplinary sanctions that may have been visited upon the firm or the
attorney signing the letter.
198. See Bergmann v. Puhl, 217 N.W. 746, 748 (Wis. 1928).
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tions are dated, transitory, or easily edited. Some economic costs-even
waste-may be incurred, with the sanctioned attorney bearing some added
burdens if his promotional activities, prior to the disciplinary determination,
have been wide-ranging. If a firm has prepaid a lifetime sponsorship of a
civic event, for example, it may have to forego all acknowledgments of
such sponsorship or append appropriate disclosures thereto. Durable goods
such as coffee mugs and other promotional trinkets present a unique diffi-
culty when used for lawyer advertising. Certainly all advertising trinkets
purchased following a sanction should carry such disclosure information.
In the tiny Ohio town where coffee mugs carry advertising for local judges
and attorneys,' 99 it might be costly and onerous to try to recall all of the
mugs and remove the advertising or put the necessary disclosure informa-
tion on them. Presumably, if the nature of the sanction was egregious
enough and the disclosure was intended to carry forward for a substantial
number of years, the lawyer may well be required to recall durables."°
Monetary and other burdens on a disciplined attorney sometimes seem
onerous.2 01 Such costs, however, are the price the profession must require
of its members for the continuing good of the legal system.
VIII. ToWARD A NEW TRADITION
No lawyer, and no client, can be indifferent to the disciplinary
enforcement system. If the process is performed sensibly and
quickly it will provide for lawyers and clients alike a needed ser-
vice to assure honorable and effective delivery of legal services.
If the disciplinary process does not meet that standard, a disaf-
fected public is likely to impose limits upon the process ....
Continuity of judicial regulation of the legal profession depends
on action taken by the profession itself
Robert B. McKay (1990)202
Deep anxiety exists in the bench and bar over the way in which law as
an institution is currently viewed. Ample evidence exists that the institution
is falling into disrespute and coming to be viewed with increasing hostil-
ity.2°3 However, American lawyers claim a history of distinction and pub-
199. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
200. In the event that the disciplinary violations were egregious enough and the person was
disbarred, the orders sometimes require that all lawyer signage must be promptly removed. See
Piller, supra note 7, at A26. By extension, the power exists to require that capital items other than
signs carrying information that the individual is a practicing lawyer must also be taken out of
public circulation pursuant to a court order.
201. Disciplined attorneys often bear the costs associated with the discipline process. See id.
(assessing disbarred attorney $48,000 for state bar association's attorneys' fees).
202. McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at iii.
203. See supra note 8.
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lic-mindedness not equaled, perhaps, by any other group within society.
The works of lawyers and judges over the years share a much deserved, but
ill-recognized, claim to respect.2' Yet, as the winds of change blow across
America during the closing years of this century, there has been a growing
sense of urgency among leaders of the bench and bar that the deteriorating
image of the profession must be addressed.2"5 The stakes may indeed be
higher than merely the image and internal self-respect of those who are
involved in the legal system. As trust in other institutions of society contin-
ues to erode,20 6 the decline of law as one of the principal institutions of a
disintegrating culture could result in a harm that reaches far beyond the
mere success or failure of the legal profession.
A. Crisis of Confidence
By the mid-1980s, the legal profession itself recognized the pro-
foundly serious crisis of public confidence.2 7 Accordingly, the leadership
of the American Bar Association in 1989 created the Commission on Evalu-
ation of Disciplinary Enforcement (the McKay Commission), with the late
Professor Robert B. McKay as chair. Pursuant to its charge,208 the McKay
204. A relative of one of the co-authors is a highly successful electrical engineer-businessman
who finally stopped all references to "ambulance chasers" and "mouthpieces" when challenged to
name the engineers who had designed the United States Constitution, or had steered the ship of
state through global wars, depression, and social upheavals.
205. See Schier, supra note 79, at 16.
The American Bar Association announced in November [1992] that it would make
improving the image of the profession a key goal nationwide during the next few
years....
While lawyers tend to agree that the public's image of the profession is poor-
improving image consistently appears as a top concern in surveys of attorneys-the
profession is less united on what the public actually thinks about lawyers, how the nega-
tive perceptions about lawyers developed and what, if anything, should be done to com-
bat those negative images.
Id.
206. Other important social institutions-including Congress, the media, the church, and
schools-are similarly viewed. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 79, at 163-64.
207. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi, A.B.A. J., Sept., 1993, at 60; see also supra note 8
(citing media reporting of lawyer misconduct and describing the reaction from various sources
within the legal community to the poor public image of the legal profession).
Professor Burnele Powell of the University of North Carolina School of Law, Chair of the
ABA Committee on Professional Discipline, sees the legal profession as going through a "crisis of
confidence" in part because of a lost focus upon what lawyers believe they should expect of
themselves. He sees a new focus on the "other regarding" rather than "self regarding" as the key
to a renewed level of professionalism that both touches and practices "ordinary morality."
Burnele Powell, The John Turner Professionalism Lecture, South Texas College of Law (March
10, 1993). One method for lawyers to become "other regarding" as a profession is to empower
their client-consumers with information through lawyer advertising that not only promotes the
advertiser but also discloses serious negative information.
208. The Board of Governors charged the [McKay Commission] to:
0 study the current functioning of professional discipline systems;
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Commission's exhaustive study and research resulted in some important
findings and a series of recommendations. z 9
Secrecy in lawyer disciplinary matters was found to be the major
source of public distrust.21 0 The public appears to view secrecy as the way
in which the profession covers up misdeeds and protects it own; suppressio
vei, suggestio falsi,21" ' or as the McKay Commission put it:
The public's expectation of government and especially of judicial
proceedings is that they will be open to the public, on the public
record, and that the public and media will be able to freely com-
ment on the proceedings.... The irony that lawyers are protected
by secret proceedings while earning their livelihoods in an open
system of justice is not lost on the public. On the contrary it is a
source of great antipathy toward the profession.212
The McKay Commission also found that the public was greatly con-
cemed about what seemed to be a lawyer discipline process that was overly
technical and did little to address most of the complaints that were levied.
It is clear that tens of thousands of clients alleging legitimate
grounds for dissatisfaction with their lawyer's conduct are being
turned away because the conduct alleged would not be a violation
of disciplinary rules. The disciplinary system was not designed to
address complaints about the quality of lawyers' services or fee
disputes. Yet in all but a few states it is the only regulatory body
available to complainants.2" 3
Those tens of thousands of clients referred to in the McKay Report, and the
tens of thousands who remained silent because of the experiences of their
neighbors, feel betrayed by the concept of self-regulation.21 4 The regula-
. examine the recommendations of the original Special Committee on Evaluation
of Disciplinary Enforcement (1970 Clark Committee) and the results of subsequent re-
form efforts;
" conduct original research, surveys and regional hearings;
" evaluate the state of disciplinary enforcement; and
• formulate recommendations for action.
McKAY REPoRT, supra note 8, at app. B.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 33.
211. "The supression [sic] of truth is equivalent to the suggestion of what is false." WVmui.m
C. BURTON, LEGAL THEsAuRus 169 (2d ed. 1992).
212. McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
213. Id. at 11.
214. To gauge the level of dissatisfaction, one need look no further than the literature dissemi-
nated by Help Abolish Legal Tyranny (HALT): An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform.
HALT was started in 1978 by two Rhodes scholars and has now grown into a lobbying group with
more than 150,000 members. One of the group's recent studies concludes as follows:
The nation's attorney-discipline agencies and procedures remain in critical need of
change. As Richard Abel, a University of California at Los Angeles legal scholar, has
reported, the state of discipline nationally is a "travesty" in which:
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tory body does not help unless the behavior falls within a narrow window of
unethical behavior; the only other option to an aggrieved client is an expen-
sive and lengthy malpractice action. Very likely, the public wishes to feel
empowered to either protect itself or to have an effective regulatory
process.
215
The McKay Commission recommendations are a serious attempt at as-
suaging public concerns about lawyer discipline. Recommendations are di-
rected at several areas and include:
216
* the need to increase public confidence in the disciplinary system;217
o the need for preventive measures;
* the need to improve interstate enforcement; and
"Misconduct is rarely perceived. If perceived, it is not reported. If reported, it is not
investigated. If investigated, violations are not found. If found, they are excused. If
they are not excused, penalties are light. And if significant penalties are imposed, the
lawyer soon returns to practice, in that state or another." (footnote omitted).
HALT, ArroRNEY Disc'xmE NATIONAL SURvEY AND REPORT 43 (1990). HALT recognizes that
many of the reforms it recommends have been endorsed by the ABA in adopting the McKay
Report, but observes that, after years of attempts at reform, disciplinary officials have made no
significant improvement. This is, HALT asserts, because "none have addressed the fundamental
conflict of interest inherent in self-regulation." Id.
215. HALT, supra note 214, at 43, states that the public needs a mechanism to: "Help resolve
disputes. Get compensation for any injury. Deter misconduct. Warn consumers about potential
misconduct. Remove serious incompetents and wrongdoers from practice." Id.
216. McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at xv-xx. The report contains other recommendations
including:
* the need to expand regulation to protect the public and assist lawyers;
* the need to strengthen regulation of the profession by the judiciary;
* the need for direct and exclusive judicial control of lawyer discipline;
* the need to expedite the disciplinary process;
* the need to provide adequate resources; and
* the need to fully implement essential provisions of the Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement.
Id. at 14-22.
Recommendations 3 and 4 envision a broader scope of public protection through competent
agencies dealing with lawyer discipline, a client protection fund, mandatory arbitration of fee
disputes, voluntary arbitration of lawyer malpractice claims and their disputes, mediation, lawyer
practice assistance, lawyer substance abuse counseling, and a public assistance central intake of-
fice. Id. at 24-30.
Recommendations 5 and 6 recognize the "basic principles of checks and balances and of
separation of powers." These recommendations further acknowledge that a "lawyer can appropri-
ately serve the profession as an elected bar official and as an appointed disciplinary adjudicator-
but not simultaneously." Id. at 48-61.
Recommendations 9-12 contemplate dealing with minor misconduct in an expedited manner
while maintaining a more traditional process for more serious problems.
217. Id. at 33. This recommendation reflects the core public concern regarding secrecy. It
contemplates that all records of the lawyer disciplinary agency (except work product of discipli-
nary counsel) should be available to the public-provided a determination has been made that
probable cause exists to believe misconduct occurred. It is this proviso that may still rankle orga-
nizations such as HALT. See supra note 214.
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0 the need for immediate action. z18
The McKay Commission's recommendations are clearly aimed at improv-
ing the real and perceived flaws of the current disciplinary system. Imple-
mentation must effectively deal not only with the seriousness of current
public disenchantment, but must also deal with the urgency of the public's
desire to be in a position to protect itself in the first instance. The goals of
the ABA in adopting the McKay Commission's recommendations and the
desires of the public for a better system move in the same direction.21
The report calls for new and creative solutions to help overcome the
crisis.220 The suggestion of a new tradition espousing disclosure advertis-
ing flows along the same path and is designed to assist the profession in
stemming the crisis of confidence by introducing true visibility to the
system.
B. Disclosure Advertising as a Down Payment Toward Restoring
Credibility
Certainly the instant proposal for visibility of discipline is not a rem-
edy for systemic distortions. Fundamentally, the rooting out and curing of
ethical problems and any systemic flaws in the enforcement of disciplinary
rules will be neither improved nor damaged by disclosure advertising. Cor-
ruption, bias, and abuse of codes of lawyer conduct and judicial ethics will
not be abolished by a system of disclosure advertising. Disclosure advertis-
ing can, however, become another tool in the hands of those who investi-
gate and enforce the various codes and disciplinary rules.
218. McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at xix-xx. Although there is no specific recommendation
respecting the need for immediacy, it is a pervasive, unspoken message throughout the report
which is introduced by observations that "[slome practices must change immediately if regulation
is to remain under the judiciary. The public views lawyer discipline as too slow, too secret, too
soft, and too self-regulated." IL
219. See supra note 216.
220. Lawyer Discipline Hearings, 76 A.B.A. J., Jan., 1990, at 109. The chairman of the Mc-
Kay Commission acknowledged that creative but pragmatic solutions need to be found.
The mission of the Commission is no less than to move the system of lawyer discipline
into a future only now beginning to be recognized. The solutions projected must be
creative, yet pragmatic enough to meet the needs of the new century, which is scarcely
further removed than around history's corner.
McKAY REPORT, supra note 8, at xi. The instant proposal is a new approach to old problems.
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IX. CONCLUSION
[A profession] without the means of some change is without the
means of its conservation.
Edmund Burke221
In 1977, the American bench and bar discarded a longstanding tradi-
tion and embarked upon a new era in attorney advertising. Another new
tradition-true visibility of discipline-is now in order. This new tradition
is not novel, however, as it inheres in the historic nature of attorney-client
relationships. Classic principles of the attorney's fiduciary obligations to
each client, and indeed to prospective clients, provide the moral predicate
for such a change.222
The public, as consumers of legal services, should view a dedicated
effort by the legal system to render disciplinary results functionally visible
as a heightened mark of renewed professionalism. Client-consumers could
then view themselves not as a group disadvantaged by lawyer advertising
coupled with a functionally invisible system of discipline, but rather as a
client group to whom the highest professional obligations are owed. Attor-
ney professionalism would come to be seen as revealing to the public those
things that may discredit individual members of the bar as well as those
things that credit them-an extension of the highest of fiduciary
principles.223
221. Paraphrased from Edmund Burke's famous observation in Reflections on the Revolution
in France. EDMUND BuRKE, REFLETONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.M. Duet 1971)
(1790).
222. The concepts of trust embodied in the core principles of the attorney-client relationship
have far-reaching implications for the role of disclosure advertising in the changing rituals by
which that relationship is established. Unlike the sale of cabbages, pick-up trucks, or insurance
annuities, the usual marketplace ethos does not control. As Justice Cardozo tellingly observed
about fiduciary relationships generally:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive is then the standard of behavior.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Moreover, a genuine believer in adversarial
practice who elevates "client service above almost all other moral considerations" (as Professor
Monroe Freedman is asserted to do in his ethical hierarchy) would be likely to conclude that the
client as consumer of the lawyer's services deserves a full disclosure of the lawyer's merits and
demerits. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freedman's Ethics, 33 Apiz. L. REv. 455,
456-62 (1991). In any event, Professor Freedman has noted without criticism the Supreme
Court's dicta in Bates and Zauderer calling for lawyer advertising to sufficiently inform cli-
ent-consumers, even through "inclusion of clarifying information in such advertisements."
MoNRoE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwvmEs' ETHics 245, 248 (1990).
223. Visibility as a new guiding belief, an ethos if you will, accentuates the profession's con-
cern for, and empathy with, the consuming public. Moreover, such an ethos appears to comple-
ment many other systemic changes now under discussion. The instant proposal for disclosure
advertising also has the fiscal advantage of not requiring public resources. By definition, the cost
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If the bar becomes the first of our core institutions to commit itself
seriously to such disciplinary visibility, its leadership mantle may be re-
stored. Visibility might become an energizing principle. As such, it may
aid not only in rebuilding the professional credibility of our legal institu-
tions, but it might also help to mold a new tradition that other actors could
come to emulate in a re-ordering and information-driven marketplace.
Moving voluntarily toward a new tradition-an ethos of disciplinary
visibility-should provide evidence of the bar's renewed devotion to its
better angels of integrity and professionalism. Even the most cynical, busi-
ness-driven lawyer, however, should recognize that restoring consumer
confidence in our legal institutions also has positive long-term business
benefits.224 A legal profession that empowers the public as cli-
ent-consumers to make informed and responsible choices is a profession,
not a mere retail commodity-a profession reaffirming its honorable, so-
cially responsible past.
would be borne in each instance by the problem attorney, not by the public nor by those lawyers
whose professionalism is a part of the solution.
224. The fictional network chairman, Philip Carlton, in Ferrer and Morgan's screenplay of The
Great Man cynically summarized a certain view of the marketplace that some, unfortunately, may
hold today: "Integrity and crusading sell products too and that, after all, is our primary business."
THE GReEAT MAN (Universal Int'l 1956).
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Exmrr A
PROPOSED GUIDING PRINCIPLES
These moderate proposed requirements for disclosure advertising are premised
upon the welfare of present and future clients, not the welfare of the violator. Ac-
cordingly, principles of client-consumer protection inherent in Disclosure Advertis-
ing mandate certain notions illustrated herein:
1. Cumulative Disclosure-Content
Upon any sanction being imposed presently, the required disclosures
would include all past sanctions in the violator's history as a lawyer.
2. Cumulative Scope and Duration
A. Repeat Violators-Same Sanctions: The scope and the dura-
tion of required disclosure should both escalate with repeated
sanctions of the same type.
B. Repeat Violators-Mixed Sanctions:
(1) Whenever a violator has a history of previous sanctions of
differing types, the scope of the required disclosure should be
that for the sanction of the most severe magnitude.
(2) The duration also should be cumulative, representing the sum
total of all the individual durations required for each of the




























* Description of sanctions generally follows ABA Joint Committee on Professional Standards model
"Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions" (as amended, February, 1992).
** In the interest of encouraging attorneys with substance abuse problems to voluntarily seek treatment
and assistance, no adverse consequences should flow therefrom.
Disclosure Key:
Scope of Disclosure Duration
A-no disclosure required N/A
B--disclosure on all discretionary communications 2 years
C--disclosure as in B above + all listings 2 years
D--disclosure as in C above + letterheads 3 years
E--disclosure as in D above + business cards 4 years
F-disclosure as in E above + office signage 5 years














1303 San Jacinto Street #232
Houston, Texas 77002-7013
Dear Mr. * *
Have you been injured? Have your rights been violated? If you or a loved one
have been injured in an accident or because of the carelessness of another person or
company, you should consult an attorney immediately.
If your legal rights or personal dignity have been violated, you owe it to yourself
to take quick action to protect those precious rights.
At this law firm, we help people who have been injured in an accident, or have
an insurance claim that is being unfairly denied. We also help people whose rights
have been violated in their place of employment, or in the course of consumer
transactions.
We practice law in the following areas:
Traffic Accidents Insurance Denials: Rights of the Disabled
Wrongful Death Cases -Health-Life Termination of Employment
Serious Personal Injuries -Fire-Disability for filing Worker's Comp.
Serious Job Injuries Consumer Rights Senior Citizens Rights
Slip & Fall Medical Malpractice Discrimination
We also handle other cases involving personal injuries, mental anguish or
economic loss. We will give personal attention to your case.
It will be a pleasure to assist you, even if you just have a legal question. Please
call us at ***** LAWS).
Sincerely,
P.S. Be sure and save the enclosed business card and call us.
* * * Licensed State Bar of Texas; Masters in International Law; Member American Bar Association;
American Trial Lawyer's Association; Houston Bar Association. Not Board Certified by State Board of
Legal Specialization. * * * Licensed State Bar of Texas; Member American Bar Association; American
Trial Lawyer's Association; Texas Trial Lawyer's Association; Houston Bar Association. Not Board
Certified by State Board of Legal Specialization. Mr. * and Mr. * are responsible for all cases in above
areas.
